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THE OWNERSHIP OF HEALTH
INSURERS
Peter Molk*
Spending by private health insurers exceeds $800 billion and is
expected to rise. The Affordable Care Act provides $2 billion in sub-
sidies to jump-start health insurers owned by their policyholders in an
attempt to bring these costs under control. Firms with this corporate
ownership structure have succeeded in other insurance markets,
where Nationwide, Northwestern Mutual, and State Farm are just a
few prominent examples. However, the potential of policyholder
ownership in health insurance, which is dominated by investor and
nonprofit ownership, is poorly understood. This Article applies theo-
ries of corporate ownership and control to analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of investor, nonprofit, and policyholder health insurer
ownership. Theory and an original empirical study of 1,000 individu-
als' projected healthcare consumption choices reveal policyholder
ownership's ability to solve contracting failures, reduce overconsump-
tion of medical services, and contribute to "bending the cost curve" of
American health expenditures in ways unattainable by investor-
owned or nonprofit insurers. The ACA's provisions for subsidizing
policyholder ownership, however, force these firms to adopt restric-
tive policies that both exacerbate potential governance costs and keep
them from maximizing policyholder ownership's advantages. In fact,
the ACA's requirements force these firms into nonprof-
it/policyholder-owned hybrid organizations that capture the ad-
vantages of neither. Using additional empirical findings, this Article
recommends ways that policyholder-owned health insurers could be
promoted consistent with sound corporate governance principles.
* Assistant Professor, Willamette University College of Law. Thanks to Amitai Aviram,
Kenworthey Bilz, Curtis Bridgeman, Dov Cohen, Chris Griffin, Mark Hall, Henry Hansmann, David
Hyman, Pat Keenan, Bob Lawless, John Morley, Urska Velikonja, Melissa Wasserman, Christen
Linke Young, participants at the American Law and Economics Association, the Midwest Law and
Economics Association, and the Law and Entrepreneurship Association annual meetings, and faculty
workshop participants at Willamette for helpful discussions. Thanks also to the National Association
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Affordable Care Act ("ACA"),' signed into law on March 23,
2010, and upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional on June 28,
2012,2 imposes significant change on the $900 billion private health insur-
ance industry.3 Proponents of reform perceived two problems: high
healthcare spending that was projected to increase and a large number of
individuals without adequate health insurance.
The ACA targeted this second problem through the headline-
grabbing individual and employer mandates, insurance exchanges, and
premium pricing restrictions.' Significant attention was also directed at
the first problem of controlling health spending, although it has received
less coverage by the popular press. One of these provisions allocated $6
billion in federal funds to subsidize "cooperative" health insurers, or in-
surers owned by their policyholders instead of investors.' Termed Con-
sumer Operated and Oriented Plans ("CO-OPs"), these insurers were
envisioned by Congress as lowering costs by increasing competition and
consumer choice, particularly in non-competitive markets.6 Although
policyholder-owned cooperatives-also called "mutuals"-are common
in other insurance markets, where prominent examples include New
York Life ($425 billion in assets), Northwestern Mutual ($230 billion in
assets), State Farm ($225 billion in assets), and Nationwide ($183 billion
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA"), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), amended by the Health Care and Education Rec-
onciliation Act of 2010 ("HCERA"), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). References in this
Article to ACA indicate PPACA amended by HCERA as applicable.
2. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). Although the Court held
unconstitutional the ACA's conditioning of continued levels of Medicare support on states' willingness
to expand Medicaid coverage, it upheld the broader regulation of the health insurance market and the
individual mandate. Id.
3. National Health Expenditures Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (July
28, 2015, 3:04 PM), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet.html.
4. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Many Low-Income Workers Say No to Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2l5/10/20/business/many-low-income-workers-say-no-to-
health-insurance.html? r=0; Sara Hansard, State ACA Exchanges Financially Sustainable, Directors
Say, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 30,2015), http://www.bna.com/state-aca-exchanges-n57982058902/.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 18042 (2012).
6. Terry Gardiner, Roger Neece, & Michael Mendelevitz, Realizing Health Reform's Potential,
8 COMMONWEALTH FuND, Apr. 2012, at 1, available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
-/media/Files/Publications/Issue%2OBriefl2012/Apr/1591_Gardinerjinnovative strategies-help.coops
.pdf; Shining a Light on Health Insurance Rate Increases, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
HEALTH SERVICES (Dec. 21, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO[Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/
ratereview.html.
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in assets),7 the decision to subsidize health insurance cooperatives drew
irate opposition and was a topic of spirited Congressional debate.' Those
on the left viewed the cooperatives as a disappointing substitute for a ro-
bust public option,9 whereas those on the right feared the cooperatives
would surely fail, taking taxpayer subsidies with them, while giving the
federal government a foot in the door towards publicly provided health
insurance. 0
Despite these concerns, Congress ultimately committed $2 billion to
assist health insurance cooperatives' formation." This is not the first time
Congress has influenced the organizational structure of health insurers to
try to control health spending. In the face of rising projected health costs
of the 1970s,'1 2 President Richard Nixon signed the Health Maintenance
Organization ("HMO") Act of 1973 to spur the creation of HMOs, in-
surers whose policyholders pay a fixed premium in exchange for covered
treatment over the year at the insurer's facilities. 3 The original HMO bill
allocated $375 million,14 comparable to the $2 billion subsidy in current
dollars," over a five-year period during which the legislation would, ac-
cording to President Nixon, "enable the Federal Government to help
7. 2013 Annual Report, NATIONWIDE 8 (2013), available at http://static.nationwide.com/
static/NAC-292-2013-Annual-Report.pdfr=42; 2013 Annual Report, NEW YORK LIFE 2 (2013), avail-
able at http://www.newyorklife.com/nyl-internet/file-types/2013-Annual-Report.pdf; Facts for 2015,
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL (2015), available at http://www.northwesternmutual.com/about-north
western-mutual/our-company/Documents/fact sheet.pdf?win-type=pdfform; State Farm Insurance
Cos., FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/state-farm-insurance-cos-41/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
8. See generally Mark A. Hall, Evaluating the Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the Beholder, 51
Hou. L. REV. 1029, 1029-30 (2014) (describing opposition to ACA).
9. Robert Pear & Gardiner Harris, Alternate Plan as Health Option Muddies Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/health/policy/18
plan.html?_- r=1 (quoting Nancy Pelosi as saying that in spite of the cooperatives, "[a] public option is
the best option to lower costs, improve the quality of health care, ensure choice and expand cover-
age").
10. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Energy & Commerce Comm., Energy and
Commerce Leaders Seek Information on Potential Cost to Taxpayers in CO-OP Program (Apr.
24, 2012), http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/energy-and-commerce-leaders-seek-infor
mation-potential-cost-taxpayers-co-op-program (identifying Representative Cliff Stearns's concerns of
"[t]he potential losses to federal taxpayers" if the cooperatives fail); Sam Stein, Kyl: Co-Ops a "Trojan
Horse" for Public Option, GOP Won't Support, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/18/kyl-co-ops-a-trojan-horsen_262075.html (quoting Senator Jon Kyl as
characterizing cooperatives as a "Trojan horse" aimed at implementing an eventual public plan).
11. Phil Galewitz, Fiscal Deal Kills New Funding for Health Law's Co-Ops, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Jan. 2, 2013), http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.orgindex.php/2013/01/fiscal-deal-kills-new-fun
ding-for-health-laws-co-ops/. In addition to the $2 billion in funding, the ACA creates a special federal
tax exemption for subsidized cooperatives, providing further (indirect) stimulus. 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(29) (2012) (co-op exemption); PPACA Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1322(h), 124 Stat. 119, 191-92
(2010) (creation of 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(29)).
12. S. REP. No. 93-129, at 1-2 (1973).
13. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 ("HMO Act of 1973"), Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87
Stat. 914 (1973) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2012)).
14. HMO Act of 1973 §§ 2, 3,87 Stat. at 930, 934-35.
15. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://
data.bis.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?costl=375&yearl=1973&year2=2014 (last visited Jan. 16,2015).
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demonstrate the feasibility of the HMO concept.""6 Forty years later,
HMOs provide health insurance to a significant portion of Americans."
Will policyholder-owned health insurers gain similar traction to
HMOs and prove a viable vehicle for health insurance delivery? Will
they do anything to curb the growth of national health expenditures? Is
there a need for policyholder ownership in light of the investor-owned
and nonprofit insurers that currently dominate private health insurance?
Despite the importance of these questions, there was little reasoned dis-
cussion about the appropriateness of health insurance cooperatives be-
fore Congress appropriated $2 billion for their benefit.'" Nor has any-
thing changed in the time since the subsidies have been handed out."
This Article considers explicitly whether there is a role for health
insurance cooperatives owned by their policyholders in providing insur-
ance and controlling costs. The Article applies theories of firm ownership
and design to determine whether the cooperative ownership structure
has advantages beyond what incumbent nonprofits and investor-owned
insurers already provide. The Article also incorporates results from an
experiment that assesses individuals' projected behavior as policyholders
under different models of health insurer ownership and uses these results
to inform how the theory could play out in practice. This combined anal-
ysis demonstrates cooperative insurers' real potential in addressing prob-
lems in modern health insurance. The analysis also reveals significant
problems in their design and governance resulting from specific condi-
tions that the ACA requires of subsidized cooperative insurers. In fact,
these restrictive conditions mean that the ACA-subsidized firms are not
really cooperatives at all and will be unable to capitalize on the benefits
offered by policyholder ownership. Indeed, hampered by these re-
strictions, half of ACA-subsidized insurers have already failed.2 0
Part II describes the current market for health insurance, focusing
on important design elements of health insurance markets that make
contracting between insurers and policyholders difficult and costly. It al-
16. President Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing the Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973 (Dec. 29, 1973), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4092.
17. See, e.g., Total HMO Enrollment, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-
indicator/total-hmo-enrollment/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (showing almost 86 million Americans as
being insured through HMOs); see generally Lynn R. Gruber et al., From Movement to Industry: The
Growth of HMOs, 7 HEALTH AFFAIRS 197 (1988) (describing rise of HMOs in response to federal
stimulus).
18. See, e.g., Frank Paquale, Jost on Cooperatives, HEALTH REFORM WATCH (June 15, 2009),
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2009/06/15/jost-on-cooperatives/ (reprinting Timothy S. Jost, Are
Cooperatives a Reasonable Alternative to a Public Plan?); Anne Underwood, So What's a Health In-
surance Co-op, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,2009, 4:02 PM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/08/17/so-whats-a-health-insurance-coop-anyway/ (interview with Timothy S. Jost).
19. Cf, Health Policy Brief, HEALTH AFFAIRS, http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief-
pdfs/healthpolicybrief_107.pdf (last updated Jan. 23,2014).
20. See Sean Williams, More Than Half of Obamacare's Co-Ops Have Now Failed - Here's Why
You Should Care, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 15, 2015, 2:18 PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/
general/2015/11/15/more-than-half-of-obamacares-co-ops-have-failed-he.aspx.
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so outlines how key provisions from state and federal regulation, includ-
ing the ACA affect this process.
Part III introduces the theory of cooperative firms, and uses this
theory to develop how cooperative health insurers can reduce these con-
tracting costs in ways that existing investor-owned and nonprofit insurers
cannot. By making policyholders the owners of the insurer, cooperatives
credibly commit to both high-quality coverage and policyholder-level re-
ductions in healthcare consumption that other insurers cannot replicate.
This Part augments the theoretical advantages with results from an origi-
nal empirical study of 1,000 individuals' projected health decisions, which
is the first systematic empirical investigation into cooperatives' potential
to reduce member-owner moral hazard-in this case, policyholders'
overconsumption of healthcare. The empirical evidence confirms that
cooperative insurers could reduce policyholder overconsumption of
healthcare, enhancing social welfare by controlling the rise in national
health expenditures. The Article finds that in a situation representative
of healthcare overconsumption, participants with a cooperative insurance
company are significantly more likely to select a low-cost treatment op-
tion relative to those with an investor-owned insurer, doing so over twice
as often, and thirty percent more likely to choose low-cost treatment
than are those with a nonprofit insurer.
Part IV addresses why market forces have not already given rise to
policyholder-owned health insurers. If cooperative health insurers could
provide significant benefits, one would expect them already to be major
players in the health insurance market, formed by savvy entrepreneurs.
The key impediment is that cooperatives require a special entrepreneur
who is willing to sacrifice personal gain for community benefit. Absent
these individuals, cooperatives start only when specialized market condi-
tions exist. I explore the differences between market conditions in the
early 20th century-when some health insurance cooperatives organized
successfully -and modern market conditions. I also compare health in-
surance to the evolution of property insurance, which shares similar
market contracting failures that could be solved by policyholder owner-
ship but which, unlike health insurance, has a significant cooperative
market share. 2 1
Part V addresses how subsidies could overcome existing market
failures to facilitate the formation of cooperative health insurers. This
21. Cooperative insurers are referred to as "mutuals" in the property/liability and life insurance
markets. Property/casualty insurance has a roughly twenty-five percent mutual market share, while
health insurance has only a one percent cooperative market share. Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of
Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899, 923, 940 (2014) (mutual market share). See also CARMEN
DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, 23 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2011pubs/p60-239.pdf (256 million Americans have health insurance.); Harris Meyer, Feds Jump-Start
Health Insurance Co-Ops with Loans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 22, 2012, 1:25 PM), http://
www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/february/21/health-coop-cooperatives-federal-loans.aspx (not-
ing that cooperative health insurers cover only approximately 2 million people before the ACA subsi-
dies).
878 [Vol. 2016
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Part considers how both financial and nonfinancial subsidies could work
in tandem with optimal governance and ownership provisions. To inform
these provisions, this Part uses additional results from an empirical inves-
tigation into individuals' projected healthcare consumption decisions to
show how these decisions are affected by how the insurer spends sur-
pluses. These results are particularly important for cooperative design, as
they show how different packages of policyholder-owner rights produce
outcomes of varying desirability.
Finally, Part VI critically assesses provisions in the ACA and asso-
ciated regulations developed by the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices that subsidize new health insurance cooperatives while imposing
restrictions on their organization and operation. These requirements
render the resulting organizations more fairly characterized as nonprofits
rather than cooperatives. Unfortunately, these restrictions will under-
mine much of the cooperatives' potential benefit and, more disturbingly,
could introduce dysfunction into these insurers' ownership and govern-
ance. I offer alternative guidelines that will provide policymakers with
much needed guidance for designing effective cooperatives, while re-
maining consistent with the ACA's overarching goals.
A systematic appraisal of the ACA subsidies is warranted for sever-
al reasons. In a $600 billion market, the rewards from these corrections
can be particularly significant. Further, it is important to critique and re-
form the ACA's cooperative provisions because they present a large ba-
sin of attraction. New cooperatives will inevitably adopt the ACA's con-
straints in spite of their disadvantages because of the sizable subsidies
that are attached, and therefore Congress has in essence co-opted the
formation of new private health insurance cooperatives. Finally, the les-
sons drawn throughout this Article address broader issues of when a par-
ticular ownership structure offers advantages and how it should be subsi-
dized. These lessons will prove useful for ongoing and future policy
decisions that determine whether or how nonprofits, cooperatives, or in-
vestor-owned firms of a specified type offer advantages and should be
subsidized.
II. CONTRACTING PROBLEMS IN THE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET
This Part introduces features of the health insurance market that
make it suited for the benefits of cooperative health insurers. Health in-
surance, even more than other types of insurance, is a product that few
individuals fully understand.2 2 When combined with sophisticated, re-
peat-player insurers, this keeps the market for health insurance contracts
from functioning perfectly. Market failures abound between insurer and
policyholder. Regardless of whether individuals obtain insurance through
the individual market or through their employer, six interrelated factors
22. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REv. 647, 659 (2011).
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drive these failures. First, individuals are comparatively unsophisticated
and have difficulty valuing insurance contracts. 23 Second, policyholders
have difficulty in comparison-shopping policies due to a lack of transpar-
ency.24 Third, many markets have only one or two dominant insurers, giv-
ing them monopolistic market power over policyholders. 25 Fourth, there
are information asymmetries: both insurers and policyholders possess in-
formation the other would like to know but cannot credibly learn,26 which
ultimately hurts policyholders. Fifth, moral hazard can lead policyholders
to overconsume medical services.2 7 And finally, relevant time horizons
for policyholders and for insurers are very different?8
As a consequence of these failures, federal and state governments
have regulated various aspects of health insurance contracting, but this
regulation is necessarily imperfect. In the following sections, the Article
briefly discusses each of these contracting problems and the correspond-
ing regulatory response. Cooperatives, by supplementing this contracting
process with an ownership relationship, can offer significant welfare
gains in each of these areas as I discuss in Part 111.29
A. Imbalance in Sophistication
First, policyholders are unsophisticated, lacking the training or ex-
pertise to effectively evaluate the convoluted language of modern health
insurance contracts. They also participate in the insurance market only
infrequently: the typical insurance policy remains in force for a year, and
a policyholder usually has only infrequent and sporadic claims to file
with her insurer.3 0 Even a policyholder with an impressive understanding
of her policy's terms will have difficulty in accurately assessing their val-
ue, because such a calculation requires knowing abstruse details such as
of the insurer's negotiated rates for medical services, the probabilities of
the policyholder requiring any particular medical service, and the selec-
tion of an appropriate discount rate -a calculation beyond the capability,
ken, or interest level of most individuals." Insurers, on the other hand,
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See infra Part II.C.
26. See infra Part II.D.
27. See infra Part II.E.
28. See infra Part II.F.
29. Because this Article is concerned with policyholder choice of health insurers, and particular-
ly health insurance cooperatives, I do not address government run Medicare and Medicaid programs
in which the insurance provider (the government) is fixed by statute.
30. See HEALTH CARE COST INST., HEALTH CARE COST AND UTILIZATION REPORT: 2010, 12
(2010), available at http://www.healthcostinstitute.org/files/HCCIHCCUR2010.pdf (finding policy-
holders with three of the largest private insurance companies in 2010 visited a health professional
about 3.3 times per year, and filled 9.3 drug prescriptions); see, e.g., Rhode Island BlueCross
Blueshield, Subscriber Agreement: BlueSolutions for HAS Direct 5000/10000, at 10 available at
https://www.bcbsri.com/sites/default/files/BlueSolutionsHSA_DenDP_5000_10000_OOE_Bronze_vii
4.pdf (listing the length of the insurance policy as one "benefit year" which automatically renews an-
nually every January 1st).
31. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 22, at 659.
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are highly sophisticated enterprises and are, of course, repeat players in
the health insurance market. They employ batteries of actuaries who use
the insurer's wealth of prior experience to estimate costs associated with
any individual's policy.3 2
This dynamic creates the potential for the insurers to take ad-
vantage of customers. Policyholder unsophistication means most custom-
ers will not appropriately price the value of policies or individual policy
terms,3 giving insurers the potential to overcharge.3 State and federal
regulation restrict, but do not eliminate, the space of possible insurer op-
portunism through a series of consumer-protection regulations.3 1
B. Difficulty in Comparison Shopping
Even if most policyholders are unsophisticated, a fluid, competitive
market could arise if policies could be compared easily to one another.3 1
With unregulated insurance markets, this does not happen.37 Health in-
surance contracts are not commodities. The terms of policies can differ in
32. Approximately seventy percent of actuaries work in the insurance industry. BUREAU OF
LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ACTUARIES: WORK ENVIRONMENT, in OCCUPATIONAL
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/math/actuaries.htm#tab-3. See
generally BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ACTUARIES: WHAT THEY DO, in
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/mathlactuaries.
htm#tab-2 (describing actuaries working in health insurance as "help[ing] develop long-term car and
health insurance policies by predicting expected costs of providing care" under a given contract).
33. See, e.g., Karen Pollitz & Larry Levitt, Health Insurance Transparency Under the Affordable
Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/perspective/health-
insurance-transparency-under-the-affordable-care-act/ ("[T]oo often, consumers don't fully under-
stand how coverage actually works until they get sick and try to use it, and then are surprised to learn
their plan doesn't pay as much, or at all, for care they thought would be covered.").
34. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Infor-
mation: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 644-45 (1979) (discussing conditions
under which suppliers respond to a critical mass of informed customers by offering all customers a
competitive price).
35. States and the ACA determine minimum levels of coverage that all plans sold to individuals,
small employers, and certain large employers must provide. They also regulate the premiums that in-
surers can charge and cap insurers' profit margins. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 119,
131, 135, 137 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); 45 C.F.R. § 158 (2014)
(implementing minimum medical loss ratios); State Approval of Health Insurance Rate Increases,
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATURES (last updated Aug., 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/healthlhealth-insurance-rate-approval-disapproval.aspx (premiums). Large employers that
self-insure can avoid much of this regulation, although fines enacted as part of the ACA encourage
employers to meet these requirements. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)-(b) (2012) (requiring payment for
large employers who fail to provide health insurance to employees); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachu-
setts, 471 U.S. 724, 736 n.14 (1985) (exempting self-insured plans from state regulation); Suja A.
Thomas & Peter Molk, Employer Costs and Conflicts under the Affordable Care Act, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. ONLINE 56, 59-60 (2013) (discussing employers' incentive to offer qualifying coverage because of
these fines).
36. Comparison-shopping in a competitive market would push insurers to offer competitive pric-
es even if policyholders could not accurately value the product, as long as insurers cannot easily price
discriminate. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 34.
37. Id. at 644-45, 651; see also D. Brad Wright, Health Insurance and Free Market Competition,
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/d-brad-wright/health-insurance-and-free-b_48511
2.html (last updated May 25, 2011, 3:45 PM) (attributing rising health insurance premiums to a "un-
regulated and non-competitive" health insurance market where consumers are not able to make sub-
stantive policy).
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important respects from one another. Deductibles, copayments, physi-
cian networks, and covered procedures routinely vary from one health
insurance policy to another.38 For an individual policyholder to price the
relative value of these differences beyond the roughest of estimates in-
volves incurring costs that make doing so not worthwhile, or impossible.39
Pricing the terms of the policy is not the only difficulty that policy-
holders face when comparison shopping. They must also evaluate the in-
surer's quality, which involves accessing and appraising the insurer's
claims practices, such as how often it denies legitimate claims. Insurers
typically do not make this information available unless required by regu-
lators, so policyholders must rely on imperfect anecdotal experience or
quasi-regulatory private bodies for rough substitutes,40 again keeping
them from accurately pricing policies regardless of sophistication. 41 States
and the federal government again, through various consumer protection
regulations, restrict but do not eliminate the space for opportunism.42
38. See CONSUMERS UNION, WHAT'S BEHIND THE DOOR: CONSUMERS' DIFFICULTIES
SELECTING HEALTH PLANS (2012), available at http://consumersunion.org/pub/pdf/Consumer%20
Difficulties%20Selecting%20Health%20Plans%20Jan%202012.pdf (discussing how this and other
difficulties make comparison shopping difficult). The network of covered doctors in particular is sub-
ject to change without meaningful advanced notice to policyholders. See, e.g., Matthew Sturdevant &
William Weir, Children's Hospital and Insurer Settle Lengthy Contract Dispute, HARTFORD COURANT
(June 12, 2012), http://articles.courant.com/2012-06-12/health/hc-ccmc-anthem-0613-20120612_1-david
-r-fusco-anthem-blue-cross-care.
39. See Randall D. Cebul et al., Unhealthy Insurance Markets: Search Frictions and the Cost and
Quality of Health Insurance, 101 AM. ECON. R. 1842, 1845 (2011) (predicting that "search frictions"
allow insurers to charge supra-competitive prices).
40. Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insur-
ance Consumer Regulation, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 418 (2014) ("[T]he vast majority of states did not
make publicly available claims payment rates of health insurers' before the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA).").
41. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 22, at 659-60.
42. The ACA requires that insurance for individuals and small employers be offered through
"exchanges" -marketplaces where plans are sorted into four categories. The plans within each catego-
ry are roughly similar, facilitating comparisons within and across categories. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 18022(d)(1) (2012); LARRY LEVITT & GARY CLAXTON, KAISER FAM. FOUND., Focus ON HEALTH
REFORM: WHAT THE ACTUARIAL VALUES IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT MEAN 4 (Apr. 2011),
available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8177.pdf (describing variation
among plans within a single category); Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine
Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REv. 125, 139-40 (2011) ("An exchange
is an entity that helps organize an underlying market and facilitate comparison shopping by buyers.").
Some state and federal law also require insurers to disclose certain claims payment infor-
mation, allowing for critical evaluation by policyholders or other parties. Schwarcz, supra note 40. And
the ACA requires individual- and group-market insurers to disclose key coverage information in an
easily digestible four page uniform document. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 119,
132-133 (2010) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15(b) (2012)); Blank Summary of Benefits and Cover-
age Form, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/
Resources/Forms-Reports-and-Other-Resources/Downloads/sbc-template-accessible.pdf. Taken as a
whole, these laws restrict but do not eliminate insurer opportunism. For instance, the uniform docu-
ment refers policyholders to their policy or plan document for complete coverage descriptions. See
Blank Summary of Benefits and Coverage Form, supra. These policy and plan documents can easily
be over one hundred pages long. See, e.g., Anthem BlueCross BlueShield, Subscriber Agreement for
Anthem Silver DirectAccess Plan (Connecticut) (on file with author) (109 pages).
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C. Market Power
Although on a national scale individual health insurers are relative-
ly small, consumers do not shop nationally for their health insurance. In-
stead, the relevant markets for health insurance are local or regional are-
as within a particular state.4 3 A study by the American Medical
Association found that in sixty-four percent of the 313 metropolitan sta-
tistical areas examined, a single insurer had a market share of at least fif-
ty percent, and in ninety-six percent of metropolitan statistical areas at
least one insurer had a thirty percent market share.44 The individuals and
small businesses that buy insurance from health insurers have far less
bargaining power than the insurers in these situations. Although large
employers might be able to exert some leverage over large insurers,"
large employers instead generally choose to self-insure and hire third-
party administrators, a market which itself can have significant concen-
tration. 46
When health insurers have large market shares and concomitant
market power, they can extract monopoly profits from policyholders. 1
To combat market power, regulators can restrict firm size or firm behav-
ior. The ACA adopts the second approach, requiring insurers to devote
eighty-five percent of premiums from large group plans and eighty per-
cent of premiums from small group and individual plans (called mini-
mum medical loss ratios) to health-related expenses,48 effectively capping
profits at no more than fifteen to twenty percent of premiums. 4 9 The ef-
fect is to limit insurer market power to a restricted range, but not to elim-
inate it. 0
43. AM MED. ASS'N, COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE 2 (2007), available at file:///C:IUsers/
CitriOOO/Downloads/amastudy.pdf.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Cf Cebul et al., supra note 39, at 1855-56 (finding that employers who do not self-insure will
still face supra-competitive prices because of search frictions in the health insurance market).
46. STATE OF N. H. INs. DEP'T, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE 2010 HEALTH INSURANCE
MARKET IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 20 (2012), available at http://www.nh.gov/insurance/lah/documents/sup-
rep_10.pdf (showing high concentration of third party administrators in New Hampshire); Bulletin
from Andrew Boron, Dir. of Ins., Ill. Dep't of Ins., to All Insurers, Registered Utilization Review Or-
ganizations, and Licensed Third Party Administrators in Illinois (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.
iwcc.il.gov/CB2012-12.pdf (requiring certain third party administrator-related activities to be conduct-
ed by companies located within the state of Illinois only).
47. Those markets with greater health insurer concentration are generally less competitive,
measured along a variety of dimensions. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-864R,
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: RESEARCH ON COMPETITION IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3-6
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09864r.pdf (collecting studies to this effect).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A) (2012).
49. Because the premiums not spent on health expenses must cover administrative and other
expenses, profits will be lower than this cap. The precise lines of what counts as health expenses versus
administrative expenses were spiritedly debated, since the more expenses that insurers could shift to
health expenses, the greater could be their potential profit margins. Medical Loss Ratios, HEALTH
AFFAIRS (last updated Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?
brief id=30.
50. Minimum loss ratios can have secondary effects as well, such as reducing premiums for
healthy individuals relative to unhealthy individuals. Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Amanda Starc, Pric-
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D. Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information-where one party to a contract has better
information than the other party-exists on both sides of health insur-
ance contracts. Both insurers and policyholders have superior infor-
mation about certain characteristics the other would like to know. When
this information is not or cannot be credibly communicated, the efficient
market for health insurance is disrupted.
First, insurers have superior information about the quality and
comprehensiveness of their health insurance products because of the fac-
tors discussed above." An imbalance in sophistication and the opacity of
health insurance contracts and insurer performance mean insurers know
better than prospective policyholders the treatments that will be covered,
the costs of covered treatments, and the friendliness of the insurer's
claims practices.52
On the other side, individual policyholders also have superior in-
formation. They may have private knowledge about their susceptibility
to costly medical expenses.5 3 Or, they may have visible risk characteristics
that the insurer is prohibited by regulation from incorporating into pric-
ing decisions (anything other than age, tobacco use, family size, and geo-
graphic area in small employer and individual markets,54 and any charac-
teristic at all in large employer markets"), which effectively amounts to
the same result. Policyholders' superior knowledge would then lead high-
risk policyholders to buy disproportionately more comprehensive insur-
ance, an undesirable process known as adverse selection."
ing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange 97 R.
ECON. & STAT. 667, 684 (2015).
51. See supra Parts II.A-C.
52. See supra Parts II.A-B.
53. Objective factors are only imperfect predictors of future health expenses. See, e.g., Dimitris
Bertsimas et al., Algorithmic Prediction of Health-Care Costs, 56 OPERATIONS RES. 1382 (2008); Yang
Zhao et al., Predicting Pharmacy Costs and Other Medical Costs Using Diagnoses and Drug Claims, 43
MED. CARE 34 (2005). See generally Hearing Before the Joint Economic Subcomm. Expanding Con-
sumer Choice and Addressing Adverse Selection Concerns in Health Insurance, 108th Cong. 49-57
(statement of Linda J. Blumberg, The Urban Institute), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/
republicans/publicl?a=Files.Serve&File id=4ad93d2a-5709-440f-bcf3-bfaed867fd4l.
54. Premiums can vary based on age by a ratio of 3 to 1, by tobacco use by a ratio of 1.5 to 1, by
geographic area, and by the number of family members obtaining coverage under a single policy.
PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 300gg); 45 C.F.R. § 147.102
(market rules and rate review final rule implementing these ratios). States can further restrict these
rating factors. See State-Specific Rating Variations, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/
state-rating.html (last updated Aug. 30, 2015).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1); see Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1602 (2011).
56. The consequences of adverse selection can be severe, and include the possibility that the in-
surance market enters a "death spiral" where insurers refuse to offer insurance. George A. Akerlof,
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 493
(1970). When insurers offer different products, this worst-case scenario becomes less likely, but high
risk individuals still can impose social costs by selecting more comprehensive insurance. See David M.
Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, 1 FRONTIERS HEALTH POL'Y
RES. 1 (1998) (finding adverse selection in health insurance plans offered by Harvard); Peter Siegel-
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Because of asymmetric information, an efficient market breaks
down. Insurers can cut back coverage or raise prices if policyholders can-
not effectively compare policies.17 Low-risk policyholders are charged
premiums as if they were higher risk, leading to an under-provision of in-
surance. Policyholders may cost insurers more than anticipated if policy-
holders possess information relevant to future losses that insurers do not
incorporate. The end result is higher-priced, lower-quality insurance.
E. Moral Hazard
In health insurance, moral hazard is the phenomenon where indi-
viduals consume more medical services when they are insured than when
they are uninsured, because insurance reduces the policyholder's mar-
ginal cost of consuming healthcare.18 Because policyholders bear only a
fraction of the cost, they may consume healthcare even when its com-
bined cost to the policyholder and insurer is less than its value to the pol-
icyholder. This socially-inefficient consumption raises the price of health
insurance and contributes to the country's rising health costs. 9
Insurers combat moral hazard through various cost-sharing ar-
rangements that force policyholders to internalize some of their costs of
medical care. Insurers also routinely require preapproval of certain costly
medical procedures where cheaper alternatives offering similar health
outcomes exist." Yet, these measures are necessarily incomplete.'
man, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1257-58
(2004) (concluding that adverse selection is more prominent when policyholders are offered a choice
among multiple plans rather than merely a choice between insurance and no insurance).
57. Although the state insurance exchanges are designed to facilitate comparison-shopping,
there is reason to believe that even here consumers will have difficulty comparing policies. See George
Loewenstein et al., Consumers' Misunderstanding of Health Insurance, 32 J. HEALTH EcoN. 850
(2013); Eric J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable?, PLOS (Dec. 18,
2013), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/joumal.pone.0081521.
58. Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535
(1968); see also Mark V. Pauly, More on Moral Hazard, 2 J. HEALTH EcoN. 81 (1983); see generally
John A. Nyman, Is "Moral Hazard" Inefficient?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 194, 197 (2004) (identifying that in
some circumstances, increased consumption of medical services may be desirable).
59. The presence of moral hazard in health insurance has been empirically identified. See, e.g.,
Liran Einav et al., Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 178 (2013)
(finding that policyholders who are more likely to exhibit moral hazard disproportionately choose
more generous health coverage); Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for
Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 251, 258-61 (1987) (find-
ing that policyholders consume more health services when policyholders' expenses are lower).
60. Only rarely, however, do insurers completely refuse to cover health services that cost more
than their expected benefits.
61. For health insurance to be actual insurance, the policyholder cannot bear the full cost of
medical treatment, and whenever policyholders pay only a percentage of incurred costs, moral hazard
can result. Further, administrative expenses keep insurers from implementing and enforcing preap-
proval (a process known as utilization review) in every circumstance where it could be effective. Insur-
ers' inability to base policyholder rates on the policyholder's prior usage of insurance also encourages
policyholder overindulgence in health services.
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F. Mismatched Time Horizons
Policyholders and health insurers have divergent time horizons. 62
Since health insurance contracts traditionally last for only a year,6 with
the policyholder able to switch insurers, insurers lack an incentive to un-
dertake policyholder-specific investments with upfront costs that reduce
future expected losses.
For instance, if at a cost of $10,000 today the insurer could reduce a
policyholder's annual expected losses by $1,000, or improve the policy-
holder's future quality of life by a $1,000 equivalent, annually, the ration-
al insurer will not incur the cost because the policyholder could switch
providers after the first year, once the insurer incurred the cost, and cap-
ture the $1,000 annual benefit from a competitor insurer." In health in-
surance, this situation emerges with preventative care and vaccinations,
which promise future benefits in return for upfront investments. When
these medical services are not required by statute or do not offer imme-
diate payoffs to the insurer, the insurer has no reason to cover them."
III. THE ROLE OF POLICYHOLDER OWNERSHIP
The prior Part reviewed characteristics of the health insurance mar-
ket that raise contracting costs between policyholders and insurers. This
Part shows how cooperative health insurers could mitigate these con-
tracting costs by augmenting the contractual relationship with an owner-
ship relationship.
Firms adopt one of three basic ownership forms, where ownership
entails the formal right to control the firm and to residual assets.6 Most
large firms are owned by investors, but ownership could also be held by
the firm's suppliers, its workers, or its customers, in which case the firm is
known as a cooperative.' Finally, the firm could be a nonprofit with no
owners, since under nonprofit law no group has the right to receive dis-
tributions of profits and often no formal control right.6 In each case,
62. See David A. Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like in Every-
thing Else, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 370,372 (2010).
63. See, e.g., Rhode Island BlueCross Blueshield, Subscriber Agreement: BlueSolutions for HAS
Direct 5000/10000, at 10 available at https://www.bcbsri.com/sites/default/files/BlueSolutions.HSA
DenDP_5000_10000_00EBronzev114.pdf (listing the length of the insurance policy as one "bene-
fit year" which automatically renews annually every January 1st).
64. The insurer could contract around this result by, for example, forcing the policyholder to pay
the $10,000 if the policyholder switches companies. Rather than do so, insurers faced with this situa-
tion choose not cover the treatment unless required by statute, perhaps because convincing policy-
holders of the investment's future return, or policyholders' difficulty in covering sizable upfront in-
vestments, is too costly.
65. See generally Hyman, supra note 62, at 372 ("[D]elivering higher quality care and/or keeping
one's patients healthier can actually make a provider financially worse off.").
66. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 11 (1996).
67. See id at 12.
68. Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,838 (1980).
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firms engage in market contracting for inputs and outputs beyond those
provided by the ownership relationship."9
Firms are generally run in a way that maximizes their owners' bene-
fits.7 0 Consequently, when policyholders own a health insurer, that insur-
er will be run differently from one owned by investors or from a nonprof-
it.7 ' These differences are particularly important when market contract-
contracting is costly, as in the ways described above. 72 When the insurer
interacts with policyholders through a market contract, as in the case of
an investor-owned or nonprofit insurer, the contracting costs can be se-
vere.73 Having policyholders own the insurer can reduce these contracting
costs, translating into lower-priced, higher-quality insurance. Since any
profits the cooperative could earn from exploiting its policyholders are
returned to those policyholders as owners, and since management is sub-
ject to policyholder control, cooperative ownership acts as a credible
non-exploitation commitment mechanism, with the firm able to credibly
guarantee to policyholders that they will not be exploited. 74 This com-
mitment in turn reduces the contracting costs between policyholder and
insurer, and it gives the cooperative insurer a competitive advantage over
an investor-owned or nonprofit counterpart.
Altering the identity of the firm's owners therefore changes the
group that is protected by ownership. When investors own the firm,
managers tend to promote investors' interests and ensure their protec-
tion.7 1 When customers own the firm, their interests are protected by the
cooperative non-exploitation commitment.6 And in the case of a non-
profit, all those who interact with the firm are protected to a degree:
since profits do not belong to any one group, management ostensibly
won't advance one set of interests to the detriment of another.77
Figure 1 summarizes how these possible ownership structures pro-
tect various classes in the case of a health insurer. Parties enveloped
within a dashed line are those potentially protected through that line's
ownership structure. Those outside the dashed line are left to interact
with the firm through market contracts and are not protected by the rel-
evant ownership structure.
69. See HANSMANN, supra note 66; Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise supra note 68.
70. See HANSMANN, supra note 66.
71. See Id. at 15; see generally LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010)
(analyzing how different corporate forms will impact interactions among suppliers, workers, custom-
ers, investors, and management).
72. See supra Part II.
73. See supra Part IIA-F.
74. See generally Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual Ownership, 105 J.
PUB. ECON. 39 (2013) (finding lower exploitation of customer-owners by credit unions).
75. See Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 68, at 842.
76. See Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 74.
77. Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise supra note 68, at 838-39. More will be said on this
topic later in this Part.
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FIGURE 1: POTENTIAL OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES OF HEALTH
INSURANCE COMPANIES
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Since the class that is protected varies by ownership type, a coopera-
tive health insurer owned by its policyholders will have different com-
parative advantages and disadvantages relative to investor-owned or
nonprofit health insurers. The following Section shows how cooperatives
could reduce the contracting costs in health insurance markets relative to
investor-owned insurers and then considers additional costs that the co-
operative ownership structure incurs. The Article then undertakes the
same analysis with respect to nonprofit insurers.
A. Benefits
Recall each of the costs that makes contracting for health insurance
difficult for policyholders: sophistication imbalance, inability to compari-
son-shop, market power, asymmetric information (on the part of both in-
surers and policyholders), moral hazard, and mismatched time horizons.
Cooperative ownership reduces each of these costs.
In a cooperative health insurer owned by its policyholders, the poli-
cyholders have the right to the insurer's profits and the formal right of
control. In most circumstances, a policyholder's welfare as a customer
and the value of the cooperative are inversely related-as the customer
relationship grows more attractive to the policyholder, the value of the
insurer decreases." For example, as the insurer's coverage becomes more
78. Id.
888 [Vol. 2016
OWNERSHIP OF HEALTH INSURERS
comprehensive for a fixed premium, the policyholder derives more value
from her customer relationship but her owner relationship suffers, as the
cooperative's profits decrease. Policyholders, therefore, face a joint max-
imization problem over the combined value of their customer relation-
ship and their owner relationship. By extension, management-
responsive to policyholder-owners' interests because of their right to
control management-likewise seeks to maximize policyholders' joint
relationship. 9 Because of policyholders' joint relationship with the insur-
er and their right of control, cooperative ownership acts as a credible
commitment that the insurer makes to refrain from exploiting its policy-
holders in a way that an investor-owned insurer might." The commit-
ment is credible because unlike other ownership structures, profits
earned at policyholders' expense accrue to those same policyholders.
This credible commitment reduces each of the health insurance contract-
ing costs discussed previously.'
Consider first the imbalance in sophistication. As was shown earli-
er,82 when policyholders are less sophisticated than insurers, insurers are
in an exploitative position to charge policyholders for coverage they mis-
takenly believe they will receive. When the profits from this exploitation
accrue to investor-owners, management of the investor-owned insurer
has a financial incentive to take advantage of the insurer's superior posi-
tion-subject to regulatory restrictions and avoiding a bad reputation
that harms future business. But, when the profits from this exploitation
accrue to those who would be exploited, there is no longer a financial in-
centive for the insurer to exploit its position. Similar arguments show
that cooperative insurers likewise have a diminished financial incentive
to exploit comparison-shopping difficulties, market power, and asymmet-
ric information relative to an investor-owned insurer.
Still to be examined are mismatched time horizons, policyholder
asymmetric information, and moral hazard. Consider the mismatched
time horizon problem: that investor-owned health insurers lack a reason
to pay for services today that will benefit policyholders only later in the
future, when the policyholder may have switched insurers.8 When poli-
79. Management may diverge from policyholder-owners' interests and pursue its own agenda to
the extent that doing so makes management better off, a process that produces "agency costs." This
problem may be more severe with cooperatives than investor-owned firms, for reasons discussed infra
Part III.B.
80. The strength of this commitment depends not just on management's responsiveness to poli-
cyholders' interests, but also on policyholders' entitlement to the cooperative's earnings being propor-
tional to policyholders' relationship with the firm as a customer. See Molk, supra note 21, at 924 for an
extended analysis of this requirement.
81. See supra Part IIA-F.
82. See supra Part II.A.
83. One example of these services would be preventative treatments that reduce policyholders'
future health expenses by more than the cost of the preventative treatment. See, e.g., Joshua T. Cohen
et al., Does Preventative Care Save Money? Health Economics and the Presidential Candidates, 358
NEw ENG. J. MED. 661, 662 (2008). A more typical example of these services would improve policy-
holders' future quality of life-but not necessarily reduce health expenses-by enough so that the pol-
icyholder would be willing to bear the expense today. Id. While policyholders with perfect information
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cyholders own the insurer, this problem is reduced. The insurer has rea-
son to cover expenses that pay back over the long term if those expenses
improve policyholder welfare, because policyholder-owner welfare is one
of the characteristics management seeks to maximize." Further, policy-
holder-owned insurers may have more credibility when they recommend
policyholders cover some of the cost of these treatments, as they have no
ulterior profit motive-they have no external group of investors to whom
profits are distributed.8 1
Likewise, when policyholders own the firm, they have a diminished
incentive to exploit informational advantages over the insurer or to run
up health costs unnecessarily, and as a result, asymmetric information
and moral hazard costs will be lower than for an investor-owned insurer.
First, since policyholders have a stake in the firm's profits, they seek to
avoid imposing unnecessary expenses on the insurer, because more in-
surer profits equals more policyholder profits. This effect is only attenu-
ated, however. Because the policyholder gets only a fraction of any ex-
pense savings, she still has reason to seek care or exploit information
when doing so benefits her more than her share of the cost.' Even
though the effect is attenuated, it is still greater than any effect experi-
enced under an investor-owned insurer where the policyholders have no
interest in the insurer's earnings.8 Further, to the extent policyholders
care about the wellbeing of fellow policyholders in addition to their own
welfare, such as when policyholders share a strong common bond, the ef-
fect can grow large enough so that some policyholders are willing to sac-
rifice small decreases in personal welfare for a broader welfare gain by
all policyholders." By forcing individual policyholders to factor in other
policyholder-owners' welfare in this way, the cooperative structure
makes it less likely that a policyholder will take advantage of asymmetric
information or engage in moral hazard.89
may be willing to pay upfront for such treatment, contracting difficulties-particularly the difficulty in
accurately and credibly conveying to policyholders which treatments might sufficiently improve later
welfare-prevent such agreements from being struck. As a result, investor-owned insurers tend not to
cover these socially-desirable treatments unless required by statute. See supra note 65 and accompany-
ing text.
84. See Avik Roy, Health Care And The Profit Motive, 3 NAT'L AFF. 35,48 (2010).
85. Of note, however, covering such treatments might raise conflicts between long-term policy-
holder-owners and short-term policyholders who join just long enough to receive coverage for these
treatments. This conflict is examined, infra, in Part VI.B.3.
86. Patricia Born et al., Organization Form and Insurance Company Performance: Stocks versus
Mutuals, in THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE 167, 177 (David F. Bradford ed.,
1998).
87. Id. at 168.
88. Such sacrifices have been observed in industries ranging from property insurance to electrici-
ty consumption to banking. See HANSMANN, supra note 66, at 259 (enterprise generally); PATRICIA
LLOYD WILLIAMS, THE CFC STORY: How AMERICA'S RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
INTRODUCED WALL STREET TO MAIN STREET 101 (1995) (electricity cooperatives); Molk, supra note
21, at 921 n.102 (property insurers).
89. Regarding moral hazard, there is a concern that policyholder ownership might push too
strongly in the other direction and lead to healthcare underconsumption, rather than merely less over-
consumption, as policyholders seek to reduce firm-level costs. While usually seen as less of a problem
than overconsumption, underconsumption of healthcare is a legitimate concern, but one that policy-
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Academics who emphasize cooperatives' potential to reduce advan-
tageous use of asymmetric information or moral hazard in this way do so
from a theoretical basis or, on occasion, introduce anecdotal evidence."
Yet, theoretical models and anecdotal evidence do not always accurately
predict actual generalized behavior." To provide additional insight, I un-
dertook an empirical test to obtain a better sense for how health insur-
ance cooperatives might reduce moral hazard. I presented individuals
with a hypothetical situation they might encounter as a policyholder. The
scenario was designed to test cooperatives' potential at reducing moral
hazard by reducing overconsumption of healthcare services. As with any
study of this nature that relies on hypothetical situations, the external va-
lidity of the study's conclusions is constrained. Nevertheless, the study
broadens what has to this point been largely a theoretical debate with a
first pass at systemically and empirically predicting actual behavior.
1. Empirical Study of Policyholder Moral Hazard
a. Methodology
Study participants were presented with a scenario in which they
were to imagine themselves with a mild knee discomfort and to consider
two treatment options. The options promised the individual substantially
similar expected outcomes and cost the policyholder nothing out-of-
pocket, but differed in their costs to the insurer. The first option (self-
treatment, followed by consulting a specialist if necessary) cost the insur-
er nothing while the second alternative (immediately consult a specialist)
cost the insurer $2,000.2 The scenario was designed to resemble a realis-
tic situation that, under existing systems, contributes to healthcare over-
consumption. For most individuals, the social welfare maximizing choice
holder-owned firms could address by, for instance, reducing policyholders' cost-sharing for these ser-
vices or even reminding policyholders of the value-to themselves and other policyholders-from
seeking at least these basic treatments. It is not unrealistic to think that policyholder-owned firms that
maximize policyholder welfare would devise additional innovative methods to address this concern.
90. See, e.g., HANSMANN, supra note 66, at 259, 280. But see Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 74
(finding empirical evidence of credit unions' lower level of exploiting asymmetric information).
91. Cf COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC
INTERACTION 15 (2003) (positing that "pure reasoning" is insufficient to predict an outcome and that
other less subtle factors influence the end result).
92. Such a situation would arise, for example, when the policyholder has no copay-perhaps
because the annual out-of-pocket maximum has been reached -and has a choice between two or more
covered medical procedures. It bears emphasizing that this scenario was one of relatively low stakes to
the policyholder, approximating the case of routine or non-emergent care. In other situations requir-
ing emergency treatment or where the expected outcomes have very different consequences to the
policyholder, it could reasonably be expected that the insurer's ownership form will have a reduced
impact.
The $2,000 figure was based on the cost of obtaining an MRI on the knee. See, e.g., Health
Care Prices: MRI Scan, Knee (2012), VIRGINIA HEALTH INFORMATION (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.
vhi.orgthealth-carecost.asp?id=IS4 (finding average cost to be approximately $2,500); Outpatient
Charge Data CY 2011, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/Out
patient201l.html (last updated June 1, 2015).
No. 3] 891
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
is the first option: to first self-treat the injury and, if that proves ineffec-
tive, to then consult a specialist. 3
Participants were recruited using Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk
service and were paid $0.50 for their participation. Participants were sev-
enty-three percent male and ranged in age from eighteen to seventy-five,
with an average age of thirty-three.94 A total of 1,000 completed respons-
es were collected. Across the entire sample, sixty-eight percent of re-
spondents chose the less expensive option, while thirty-two percent opt-
ed for the more expensive choice.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of seven conditions that
varied the ownership structure of participants' health insurer. The seven
conditions were: (1) for-profit investor-owned with the ownership struc-
ture term undefined; (2) for-profit investor-owned with the term defined;
(3) nonprofit undefined; (4) nonprofit defined; (5) cooperative unde-
fined; (6) cooperative defined; and (7) ownership structure unspecified.
These seven conditions and their relevant language are collected in Table
1.9 In each condition, participants were presented with the above scenar-
io and asked which treatment option they would choose and with what
degree of confidence. Participants were then asked about their reactions
to various aspects of the scenario. Participants were finally asked to re-
spond to questions comprising an individualism-communitarianism index
designed to capture their involvement in and dependence on groups, 96
and to provide demographic information. The order that items were pre-
sented was randomized across each section.
b. Results and Implications
Tables 2 and 2a9 contain the results of logit regressions for the em-
pirical model that predicts the likelihood of participants' choosing the
less expensive treatment option." Predictive independent variables
93. See infra Tables 2 & 2a.
94. Prior studies have found Mechanical Turk participants to be reasonably representative of the
United States population for a variety of analyses. Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber, & Gabriel S.
Lenz, Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk,
20 POL. ANALYSIs 351, 366 (2012). The sample recruited for this study appears skewed towards male
respondents, but gender was not associated with a significant difference in responses except when in-
teracted with those identifying with Asian ethnicity. Id.
95. See infra Table 1.
96. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-
Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 465 (2007) (developing this index).
97. See infra Tables 2 & 2a.
98. The model was specified by Choicei = flo + PiX + f 2ScenarioTypei + Ej where i refers to an
individual. Individuals' selections were first measured as a discrete variable derived from individuals'
treatment choice and confidence in that choice, and ranged from -7 (extremely confident choice of
self-treatment) to 7 (extremely confident choice of seeing a specialist). The distribution of this
choice/confidence variable turned out to be bimodal, so it was transformed into the indicator variable
Choicei with values -3 to -7 indicating self-treatment (1) and values 3 to 7 indicating specialist (0). The
results do not qualitatively differ if the indicator variable is constructed using the values -4 to -7 / 4 to 7
or -1 to -7 / 1 to 7. Xi is a vector of individual characteristics variously including demographic infor-
mation, degree of individualism continuous from 1 to 5, and reported political leanings discrete from 1
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include: (1) demographic information; (2) the individualism-commun-
itarianism index; (3) reported political leanings; and (4) an indicator for
the type of health insurance company ownership.
Across all model specifications, participants who identified as
"Asian" were significantly less likely to choose the cheaper treatment op-
tion. Older individuals were more likely to choose the cheaper option.
Other demographic indicators were not significantly associated with
choosing one treatment option over the other. Perhaps surprisingly, nei-
ther one's political leanings nor one's position along the individualism-
communitarianism continuum were significantly associated with choosing
one treatment option over another.
Along ownership dimensions, participants were not significantly
more likely to choose the low-cost treatment option when presented with
an undefined cooperative health insurer relative to the undefined inves-
tor-owned insurer baseline. This finding is consistent with a low public
awareness of what it means for a firm to be a cooperative." If individuals
do not know what the cooperative ownership structure means, they may
have no reason to alter their healthcare choices. However, when partici-
pants were given a sentence synopsis of the organizational form ("in a
cooperative, the policyholders elect the company's management and
share the company's profits"), the cooperative insurer was strongly asso-
ciated with a more than doubled increased probability of choosing the
low-cost treatment option, robust (at the one percent significance level)
to various individual characteristics. This finding provides empirical sup-
port for the theoretical prediction that cooperatives could reduce mem-
ber-owner moral hazard, and thereby address society's overconsumption
of medical services.
The undefined nonprofit health insurer is weakly associated with an
increased probability of choosing the low-cost treatment option. This
finding could result from a "warm glow" that many attach to nonprofits
that may deter individuals from imposing costs on the nonprofit." It
could also be that a fraction-but not all-of the participants knew what
the nonprofit ownership structure implies and were moderately willing to
reduce their healthcare consumption. As discussed later in Section C.3,
theory predicts that nonprofits, like cooperatives, could reduce policy-
holder moral hazard, although nonprofits will be less effective. When
(very liberal) to 5 (very conservative). ScenarioType is a vector of indicator variables indicating the
scenario presented (ownership type and whether a definition was provided).
99. See, e.g., Jerry Markon, Health Co-Ops, Created to Foster Competition and Lower Insurance
Costs, are Facing Danger, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/health-
co-ops-created-to-foster-competition-and-lower-insurance-costs-are-facing-
danger/2013/10/22/elc961fe-3809-11e3-ae46-e4248e75c8ea-story.html (describing efforts to inform
potential policyholders about cooperatives). Participants' responses in the undefined cooperative con-
dition to what they thought it meant for a firm to be a cooperative confirm this result: "Where the in-
surance company cooperates with doctors;" "I honestly have no idea;" "Everybody pitches in;" "It is
run by workers for workers."
100. See Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Exemption Requirements, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP & FIN.
L. 475, 477, 535 (2012).
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participants were given a sentence synopsis of the organizational form
("in a nonprofit, any earnings must be used to support the company's
mission and cannot be distributed to individuals"),10t the probability of
participants' choosing the low-cost treatment option increased, as did the
significance of the relationship. The strength of the relationship, howev-
er, was not as great as that with the defined cooperative. This suggests-
consistent with the theory discussed later in this Part-that cooperatives
are better at reducing policyholder moral hazard than nonprofits.'02
Unsurprisingly, neither the defined investor-owned insurer ("inves-
tors elect the management and share the company's profits")103 nor the
unspecified ownership condition was associated with any changed ten-
dency to choose the low-cost treatment, consistent with the idea that an
investor-owned insurer gives policyholders no reason to reduce their
healthcare expenditures.
Taken as a whole, the results suggest that respondents cared primar-
ily about the personal financial implications from their choice-their ex-
pected health outcome and if they would capture the insurer's savings
from choosing the low-cost option. More community-oriented partici-
pants were no more likely to choose the low-cost option even if it saved
the community (other owners) money. Additionally, only those owner-
ship forms in which the insurer's savings are captured by participants-
the cooperative and the nonprofit-were associated with an increased
likelihood of choosing the low-cost option.1'1 This hypothesis is rein-
forced when considering respondents' reactions to questions posing dif-
ferent uses of surplus by insurers, discussed in Part V, which show that
promised direct distributions of surpluses to policyholders were the most
effective method of promoting the low-cost treatment option."os
The empirical results confirm the idea that cooperative insurers
could provide the social benefit of reducing overconsumption of health
expenditures, addressing policyholder moral hazard. Such behavior
would both reduce the insurer's expenses and constitute a meaningful
step towards "bending the cost curve" of the United States' health ex-
penses, which many attribute to an existing incentive system that pro-
motes overconsumption of health services.106
101. Id.
102. See infra Part III.C.3 for additional discussion.
103. See infra Part III.C.3.
104. Policyholders have no formal or informal right to the insurer's profits when the insurer is
investor-owned. However, the insurer's savings are directly capturable through the cooperative-
policyholders are entitled to the firm's surplus. And the insurer's savings may be indirectly capturable
through the nonprofit, which has no formal owners and therefore no group to which management
might feel compelled to distribute earnings. See infra Part III.C for additional discussion on this non-
profit issue.
105. Additional experimentation that varied the treatment costs to the policyholder and the in-
surer and that varied participants' ties to other cooperative owners would shed additional light on this
issue.
106. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 941, 961-62 (1963).
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B. Costs
The prior Section shows how cooperative insurers owned by their
policyholders promise to reduce the contracting costs parties face com-
pared to investor-owned insurers. These savings improve social welfare;
as healthcare becomes more affordable and of better quality, more indi-
viduals obtain affordable coverage, and socially inefficient use of medical
services is curbed." Investor-owned insurers have some comparative ad-
vantages over cooperatives, however, which are the subject of this Sub-
section.
The comparative advantages of investor-owned companies are two:
(1) their financing costs are lower, and (2) their ability to reach consen-
sus among owners is easier, which reduces susceptibility to management
agency costs. These advantages can be construed as costs of cooperatives.
I discuss these in order, concluding that neither is insurmountable.
1. Costs of Capital
Although both investor-owned firms and cooperatives can use debt
to finance some of their operations, investor-owned firms are in a better
position to attract equity. While cooperative health insurers can draw
equity only from the limited pool of their policyholders, investor-owned
health insurers have the much broader pool of investors open to them.Ios
A more expansive equity pool necessarily results in lower costs of equity,
which in turn reduces the need for, and lowers the cost of, debt." In ad-
dition, because investor-owners are better diversified than are coopera-
tive owners (who risk both their equity investment and their policyholder
relationship on the insurer's success), equity costs for investor-owned
firms are lower still.
While it is true that financing costs will be higher for cooperative
health insurers than for investor-owned health insurers, these costs are
not particularly worrisome because health insurers require relatively lit-
tle financing to carry out their operations.no Health insurers act primarily
as an intermediate party between policyholders and healthcare provid-
ers, and their primary functions involve spreading risk among the former
107. See generally PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 24-25 (1992) (discussing the effect of organizational structures and processes on effi-
ciency).
108. See Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899,907 (2014).
109. When equity is cheaper, firms will finance proportionately more of their operations with eq-
uity and less with debt. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (analyzing the
tradeoffs between debt and equity financing). As equity financing increases, the cost of debt financing
falls because equity claims are subordinate to debt claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012) (bank-
ruptcy priority rules); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504-05 (1913). The net result is that both
equity and debt financing will be cheaper for the investor-owned firm.
110. Id.
No. 3] 895
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
and facilitating negotiated payments to the latter."' When these functions
are combined with the fact that health insurance policies are binding only
for a single year, health insurers do not need the significant financing re-
serves'l2 that are required by liability and life insurers, who must cover
uncertainty associated with liabilities that do not show up until many
years after premiums are paid. Of course, some capital will still be re-
quired-health insurers must maintain a cushion to pay unexpectedly
large claim years and meet state solvency requirements,'14 plus accumu-
late a large enough policyholder and provider base to prove viable-but
this requirement is relatively modest.
2. Decisionmaking
Owners must decide how the firm should be run, whether they run
the firm themselves or, as invariably happens, whether they hire a man-
agement team to run the firm for them. Investor-owners generally seek
to run the firm to maximize its financial value,"' since doing so in turn
maximizes investors' returns. Because investor-owners are unified in
achieving this goal, their management has relatively clear direction for
how to run the firm."6 Transferable ownership interests and a market for
corporate control keep management from straying too far from this
path." 7
Owners of cooperatives may not have as clear a consensus for run-
ning the firm, because their maximization function has more moving
111. See The Role of Insurance Intermediaries, COUNCIL OF INSURANCE AGENTS & BROKERS,
https://www.ciab.com/uploadedfiles/resources/roleofinsint.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
112. For example, the nonprofit Freelancers Insurance Company, started in 2009, has $17 million
in debt and accumulated surplus (an analogue of equity) compared to $96 million in premiums. A.M.
BEST, BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS, LIFE/HEALTH (2011). On a smaller scale, Cuatro LLC com-
menced operations in 2011 using $5 million in debt and capital financing. Id. See generally NAT'L
ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, UNIFORM CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY APPLICATION: STATUTORY
MINIMUM CAPITAL AND SURPLUS REQUIREMENTS (2014), available at http://www.naic.org/
documents/industry ucaa_chartmin-capital-surplus.pdf (identifying state minimum capital and sur-
plus requirements for new insurers).
113. Notably, however, several established nonprofit insurers have accumulated large surpluses
that they could use to subsidize current premiums, making themselves more competitive and potential-
ly allowing them to undercut prices of new entrants. See, e.g., A.M. BEST, BEST'S INSURANCE
REPORTS, LIFE/HEALTH (2011) (illustrating that Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida Group holds $3
billion in unassigned surplus out of $6 billion in total liabilities while Blue Shield of California Group
holds $3.5 billion in unassigned surplus out of $6 billion in total liabilities). Much of these surpluses
accumulated when nonprofit insurers were exempt from corporate income taxes. It would be troubling
from a policy perspective if these accumulated surpluses were spent in such a difficult-to-detect anti-
competitive fashion.
114. See Financial Reporting, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.iii.org/
publications/commercial-insurance/how-it-functions/financial-reporting (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
115. See HANSMANN, supra note 66, at 62-63.
116. Id. Note, however, that investor ownership may also involve some heterogeneity of prefer-
ences, particularly across investors with different time horizons or cash flow generation requirements,
as with venture capital or private equity investors versus more traditional investors. Any heterogeneity
among investors will undermine investor ownership's relative advantages.
117. Note that this threat only crudely bounds agency costs. Because of the effort involved in as-
sembling a controlling interest, there remains a considerable range of agency costs that go unpunished
by this market mechanism. Id. at 59.
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parts-they seek to maximize the combination of the firm's value and the
value of their relationship with the firm as a supplier, worker, or custom-
er. This second relationship may vary across owners, so that what most
benefits one cooperative owner may not maximize the welfare of others.
When these conflicts result, owners either disagree over how the firm
should be run-raising the costs of reaching consensus and freeing man-
agement from oversight to the extent a clear consensus is not
reached"s -or delegate more power to management to avoid raising con-
flict among owners, but raising agency cost concerns.
Applying this insight to the case of policyholder-owned health in-
surance cooperatives, one can immediately see that concerns over deci-
sion-making difficulties are legitimate. There will be significant variation
in how different policyholders maximize their own welfare. Younger cus-
tomers might want the insurer to focus coverage on preventive care to
the exclusion of covering end-of-life care, while older customers would
benefit financially from seeking the reverse. Preventing these conflicts
from becoming insurmountable may require delegating substantial au-
thority to management, trusting management to strike an appropriate
balance but risking the firm's efficiency."'
Delegating this authority to management, however, does not neces-
sarily mean agency costs will grow out of control. Similar conflicts among
policyholder-owners arise with mutual property-casualty insurers, but the
available evidence suggests that mutual insurers are no less efficient-
and in some circumstances are more efficient-than investor-owned in-
surers.120 Outside of insurance, the investment company Vanguard-
owned by purchasers of its mutual funds-has achieved considerable
success in spite of significant delegations of power to management to
avoid the conflicts that would otherwise result among owners. 2 ' Un-
doubtedly, the need to succeed in competitive markets bounds these
firms' agency costs.
Just as with costs of capital, then, cooperatives' higher decisionmak-
ing costs are not insurmountable. When combined with their ability to
118. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAw 37-38 (1991) (discussing how conflicts among different classes of owners could
threaten a firm's operations); HANSMANN, supra note 66, at 44 (same).
119. See infra Part IV for thoughts on how to address this tradeoff.
120. See Born et al., supra note 86 at 191; Ulrike Birkmaier & David Laster, Are Mutual Insurers
an Endangered Species?, 4 Swiss RE, SIGMA 3 (1999). Additionally, recent empirical work has con-
firmed that management turnover at mutual property-casualty insurers is positively associated with
poor market performance (albeit less strongly than for investor-owned insurers), suggesting that poli-
cyholders still monitor management's performance and limit agency costs. See Enya He & David W.
Sommer, CEO Turnover and Ownership Structure: Evidence from the U.S. Property-Liability Insur-
ance Industry, 78 J. RISK & INS. 673 (2011); Jiang Cheng et al., Organizational Form, Ownership Struc-
ture, and Top Executive Turnover: Evidence from the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry (June 28,
2013), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2326797.
121. John Morley, The Separation of Investments and Management: A Theory of Investment Fund
Structure and Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014) (discussing the delegation of authority to Van-
guard management); Bill McNabb on the Markets, the U.S. Debt Crisis, and Fee Wars, VANGUARD
(Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.vanguard.com.hk/portallarticles/researchimarkets-economy/bill-menabb-
on-fee-wars-debt-crisis-tlrv.htm (identifying Vanguard's cooperative structure).
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solve market contracting problems, cooperative health insurers promise
significant potential welfare gains relative to investor-owned insurers.
Next, I compare cooperatives to nonprofit health insurers, the other
dominant method of health insurer ownership.
C. Comparison to Nonprofits
Nonprofits are firms that are barred from distributing earnings to
private individuals.'22 This non-distribution constraint serves a similar
protectionist function as does the cooperative ownership structure, mak-
ing the nonprofit form effective at solving contracting difficulties when
the quality of the firm's output is difficult to gauge reliably.2 3 At first
blush, therefore, it might appear as if cooperatives have little to add to
health insurance that the nonprofit structure could not already accom-
plish.
However, because the nondistribution constraint prohibits nonprof-
its from distributing earnings to anyone, the nonprofit form provides pro-
tection from exploitation to all parties interacting with the firm, as illus-
trated in Figure 1.124 Suppliers, workers, customers, and lenders need not
worry that profits are being funneled out to others. Further, although
nonprofits, like other types of firms, have a duty to pursue their corpo-
rate purpose, nonprofits' purposes are generally a broadly defined social
good that gives management the freedom to respect any party's interests
while remaining true to their corporate purpose.'25 Nonprofit health in-
surers thus protect not just policyholders, as would cooperative health
insurers, but also employees, suppliers, and lenders related to the pursuit
of this purpose."' This critical distinction results in important differences
between nonprofit and cooperative health insurers. Nonprofits have
greater agency cost concerns; nonprofits' ability to solve policyholder
contracting problems will be weaker; and nonprofits' policyholders will
have a diminished incentive to curb overuse of healthcare services. Each
is considered below.
1. Agency Costs
Management agency costs will be more severe for the nonprofit
than the cooperative. Nonprofits' management is typically self-
appointing without a vote by membership, leaving members without
122. Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise supra note 68, at 838.
123. Id. at 843-44.
124. See supra Part III.
125. See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONSOLIDATION BETWEEN BLUE CROSS OF FLORIDA AND BLUE
SHIELD OF FLORIDA 1-2 (July 1, 1980), http://images.sunbiz.org/COR/2013/0822/50934770.Tif (de-
scribing nonprofit insurer's general corporate purpose of maintaining health plan consistent with
community needs, addressing economic and delivery problems in healthcare, and assisting other
health-related nonprofit organizations). As discussed immediately below, this managerial freedom is
heightened by low levels of member and regulatory oversight, as well as the lack of meaningful fiduci-
ary duties owed to any particular group.
126. See id.
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even a formal right to control management.12 7 Self-appointment gives
management less reason to be responsive to constituents' interest than
the management of even a large cooperative with attenuated owner in-
terests, which raises the severity of potential agency costs.
The states' attorneys' general are a hypothetical check on agency
costs unique to nonprofits. They are responsible for making sure non-
profits pursue their mission and for enforcing nonprofits' nondistribution
constraint, which generally requires that management's compensation be
"reasonable" and which might deter extreme cases of agency costs.11 Un-
fortunately, this enforcement is spotty at best and can be detrimental to
constituents' interests at worst.1 2 9
2. Policyholder Contracting Problems
Nonprofits are not as well situated as are cooperatives to address
the contracting problems in health insurance markets. Although the
nondistribution constraint prohibits nonprofits from explicitly distrib-
uting earnings to any individual or group, these earnings can still be dis-
tributed indirectly and be consistent with the nonprofit's corporate pur-
poses. They might, for example, be distributed to suppliers by paying a
bit more for medical treatments, to employees by making working condi-
tions more favorable or increasing wages, or to policyholders by reducing
future premiums or increasing the quality of care. Or they might not be
distributed at all. The nonprofit might retain earnings and amass a sub-
stantial endowment."o Nor does management of a nonprofit owe fiduci-
127. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 159 (2004). For those few nonprofits where members have voting
rights, the diverse membership base and the lack of a profit interest produces voter apathy and an ef-
fectively self-appointed management. An example of the risks that result from this situation emerged
when anti-immigration activists attempted to take over the Sierra Club-a nonprofit with an elected
board-by allegedly recruiting new members solely to elect the activists. Joey Bunch, Sierra Club Vote
Rejects Lamm, Allies, DENVER POST, Apr. 22, 2004, at Al.
128. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr § 6.41(a) (2008). Public disclosure can also be a check on
agency costs. See generally Brian D. Galle & David I. Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency
Problem: Evidence from U.S. Colleges and Universities (Aug. 1, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187979 (finding that disclosure of high university president salaries provokes
sanction by donors); Brian D. Galle & David I. Walker, Sunshine, Stakeholders, and Executive Pay: A
Regression-Discontinuity Approach (Dec. 17, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2363013 (same).
129. Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations and Those Who Control Them:
The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 141 (1995) (arguing for low enforcement
in the charitable sector); Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and
Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey's Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2008) (explaining val-
ue-destroying enforcement). The I.R.S. provides additional scrutiny of charitable exempt nonprofits,
but this oversight, too, is often superficial and, in any event, no longer applies to nonprofit health in-
surers, which lost their tax exemption in 1986. 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(m), 833 (2012) (exemption revoca-
tion). See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 9 (2d
ed. 2006) (citing GILBERT M. GAUL & NEILL A. BOROWSKI, FREE RIDE: THE TAx-EXEMPT
ECONOMY (1993)).
130. Ultimately, when the nonprofit dissolves, these profits are distributed according to the organ-
ization's plan of distribution. For a representative example, compare 805 ILCS 105/109.10 (2015)
(broadly prohibiting distributions prior to dissolution) with 805 ILCS 105/112.17 (2015) (distribution
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ary duties to act in the interests of any particular group of patrons."'
Nonprofits therefore fail to offer a credible commitment against exploit-
ing policyholders, since gains from doing so need not inure to policy-
holders' benefit.
When this is combined with the self-perpetuating management that
many nonprofits feature, policyholders cannot trust that the nonprofit
insurer's earnings will ultimately inure to their benefit, as they do with a
cooperative. The protection policyholders gain from the nondistribution
constraint is therefore nowhere near the protection that cooperatives of-
fer, making nonprofits less effective at reducing the insurer-policyholder
contracting costs discussed in Part II.132 The enhanced protection that co-
operatives offer policyholders comes at the expense of less credibility to
refrain from exploiting other classes -suppliers or workers, for in-
stance-but as these relationships do not appear to exhibit any particu-
larly egregious exploitative opportunities in health insurance; a favorable
tradeoff.
3. Policyholder Moral Hazard
Cooperative health insurers stand to reduce policyholder moral
hazard-the overconsumption of healthcare -because policyholder-
owners of a cooperative health insurer have a stake in the insurer's prof-
its. Policyholders of the nonprofit insurer, however, have no direct inter-
est in the insurer's profits. Although the insurer's earnings can be dis-
tributed indirectly to policyholders, management can just as easily decide
to distribute those earnings to other groups instead, because policyhold-
ers have no superior entitlement to any share of the savings from re-
duced healthcare consumption. Therefore, policyholders of nonprofit in-
surers have less reason to minimize health expenses than do cooperative
policyholders, and cooperative insurers have superior potential for man-
aging policyholder moral hazard.
upon dissolution). See generally MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT §§ 6.40, 6.41(c) (2008) (prohibiting
distributions except upon dissolution).
131. Natalie Brown, Note, The Principal Problem: Towards a More Limited Role for Fiduciary
Law in the Nonprofit Sector, 99 VA. L. REV. 879, 894-98 (2013). Even in the particular case of mutual
benefit nonprofits-nonprofits organized for the benefit of their members-there is no fiduciary duty
exclusively to members. See Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through
the Gaps Between Law and Practice, 76 FORD. L. REV. 521, 525 (2007).
132. Although the management of a cooperative could also indirectly distribute profits to a class
other than policyholders in the same way as could a nonprofit, fiduciary duties owed to policyholder-
owners, and the fact that management is responsible exclusively to policyholders via policyholder vote,
both constrain this activity.
900 [Vol. 2016
OWNERSHIP OF HEALTH INSURERS
IV. WHY ARE THERE So FEW POLICYHOLDER-OWNED HEALTH
INSURERS?
Cooperative health insurers offer the prospect of mitigating several
of the concerns plaguing policyholders in health insurance markets in
ways that investor-owned and nonprofit insurers cannot. Their relative
costs-higher capital costs and governance costs-also are solvable.
Why, then, do cooperative insurers have no meaningful presence in
modern health insurance markets if they offer compelling welfare gains?
This Part answers this question.
In other work, I have identified and analyzed the market situations
necessary for entrepreneurs to choose the cooperative model over its
competitors.1 3 3 Briefly put, entrepreneurs are unlikely to start new firms
as cooperatives, because the entrepreneur must share most of the firm's
surplus with other owners for the cooperative to offer a credible non-
exploitation commitment to its policyholders and attain its comparative
advantages. 134 Further, brokers are unlikely to convert existing firms to
cooperatives, because the costs of coordinating an existing group of the
firm's patrons to buy out the firm and make it a cooperative typically
make such a transfer unprofitable. 33 Neither problem plagues investor-
owned firms, and nonprofit health insurers, until recently, benefited from
federal and state tax subsidies to aid their formation.1 36
Despite these difficulties, two situations emerge where cooperatives
will appear. First, certain altruistic entrepreneurs might value other own-
ers' welfare in addition to their own. These entrepreneurs would start a
cooperative if the cooperative offers more total surplus to owners, even if
the entrepreneur's personal share of that surplus is lower for the cooper-
ative. And second, the cooperative structure may offer such compelling
efficiencies over an investor-owned or nonprofit counterpart that the en-
trepreneur's small personal share of the cooperative's greater welfare
gains makes the entrepreneur better off than the entrepreneur's larger
personal share of an investor-owned firm's lower welfare gains or the
gains from starting a subsidized nonprofit."'
These two situations are uncommon, but they explain both why
some health insurance cooperatives originally formed as well as why so
few overall have organized. Modern health insurance started compara-
tively late, beginning with the founding of the first Blue Cross plan in
133. Molk, supra note 21, at 929-45.
134. Id. at 930-35.
135. Id. at 935-39.
136. Id. at 931-32, 946-47.
137. Id. at 933-35. This second circumstance, while often favoring investor-owned insurers over
cooperatives, would more often appear to favor cooperatives over nonprofit insurers because nonprof-
its cannot distribute profit shares to entrepreneurs, yet many nonprofit insurers were organized. As
will be discussed shortly, physician resistance greatly raised the costs of starting cooperatives but not
nonprofits, because the medical industry was routinely able to dominate the boards of nonprofit insur-
ers. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
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1929.38 Medical technology had been fairly limited, keeping down medi-
cal expenses and any need for insurance."' As medical expenses rose and
incomes plummeted from the Great Depression, the idea of medical in-
surance grew more attractive to consumers and the industry grew."
Health insurance was slow to develop even after the first Blue Cross
plan started because of moral hazard concerns that those covered by in-
surance would seek more medical attention and increase medical ex-
penses, driving the insurer into insolvency.14 ' Consequently, early insur-
ers like the Blue Cross plans focused on covering surgeries and other
non-elective expenses not subject to policyholder moral hazard. 4 2 Nota-
bly, this left entire swaths of medical expenses without insurance,' which
did not begin to be covered until the 1940s, when tax deductions for in-
surance benefits and the threat of a national insurance program stimulat-
ed private provision of this insurance."
The 1930s through 1940s was the most active time of spontaneous
cooperative health insurer formation.14 1 Cooperatives organized primari-
ly in rural areas and other locations where existing health insurers had
138. ROBERT CUNNINGHAM III & ROBERT M. CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES: A HISTORY OF
THE BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM 5-6 (1997); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 294-95 (1982). Company doctors-salaried doctors who
treated employees for a particular employer-had also achieved modest success during the prior dec-
ade but were soon eclipsed by Blue Cross and its successors. CUNNINGHAM III & CUNNINGHAM JR.,
supra at 8; STARR, supra at 294.
139. See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change in Medicine Worth
It?, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 11, 11 (2001) ("It is widely accepted that technological change has accounted
for the bulk of medical care cost increases over time.").
140. For data on medical expenses' share of GNP, see Joseph P. Newhouse, Medical Care Costs:
How Much Welfare Loss?, 6 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 4 (1992).
141. STARR, supra note 138, at 291-92. While adverse selection-sick people disproportionately
buying insurance-was also a concern, one way companies could manage it was by insisting that a min-
imum percentage of a relevant population (workforce or community, for example) commit to buying
insurance before anyone could obtain insurance. Requiring that a minimum portion of the population
buy insurance ensures that the policyholder pool contains at least a certain percentage less-risky indi-
viduals. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM III & CUNNINGHAM JR., supra note 138, at 5 (early plan that required
participation by seventy-five percent of teachers); MICHAEL A. SHADID, CRUSADING DOCTOR: MY
FIGHT FOR COOPERATIVE MEDICINE 89 (1992) (recounting plan to start insurer only if approximately
eighty-five percent of the relevant population joined). Although later insurers adopted the more effec-
tive approach of varying premiums to reflect risks, early insurers typically charged everyone an identi-
cal amount owing to the lack of historical data upon which to base premium variations. See
CUNNINGHAM III & CUNNINGHAM JR., supra note 138, at 5.
142. CUNNINGHAM III & CUNNINGHAM JR., supra note 138, at 101.
143. For instance, the Blue Cross plans covered only some hospital-related expenses, leaving oth-
er hospital-related expenses as well as all physician services uninsured. See id. at 6.
144. Id. at 56-57, 60-61.
145. STARR, supra note 138, at 320-22. I ignore "cooperative" health plans promoted by the fed-
eral government as part of its New Deal Farm Security Administration. For in-depth treatment of
these plans, see MICHAEL R. GREY, NEW DEAL MEDICINE: THE RURAL HEALTH PROGRAMS OF THE
FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (2002). Many of the key features of these plans were determined
by the federal government, making them poor indicators of the potential viability of private coopera-
tive health plans. These plans were back-stopped by the federal government, required that doctors
treat according to a reduced fee schedule, reimbursed doctors a pro-rated amount of their billings de-
pending on how much all doctor billings in a community exceeded a fixed pot of money set by the
farm security administration, and generally had no policyholder governance or ownership rights. Id. at
59,62.
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not yet penetrated.'" They also covered expenses that other insurers
were unwilling to touch.147 The more ambitious of these were pre-paid
medical service plans, where the plan employed salaried doctors and of-
fered policyholders a range of medical services for no or low incremental
cost in exchange for premiums, approximating pure HMOs of today.1*
Others operated as more traditional insurers, being owned by policy-
holders but not employing salaried doctors or owning medical facilities
directly. 149
Several of these plans were started by altruistic, idealistic entrepre-
neurs, fitting the first situation of when cooperatives will form spontane-
ously.' These entrepreneurs preferred to maximize total stakeholder
welfare with the cooperative over greater personal financial returns (but
lower overall total welfare) from organizing as an investor-owned insur-
er."' Some cooperative entrepreneurs also fell into the second category:
for them, the smaller share of larger cooperative profits could have been
more remunerative than an alternative organizational form.152
The initial success of these early cooperative plans, however, was
promptly quashed by organized and vociferous physician resistance,
greatly deterring any additional spontaneous formation.'53 Organized
medicine resented any introduction of outside forces that might have a
say in determining their pay or compromising their independence.'54 En-
trepreneurs of cooperative insurance plans and physicians involved in
146. STARR, supra note 138, at 320-21.
147. Id. at 322.
148. Id. at 321-23; SHADID, supra note 141, at 96.
149. STARR, supra note 138, at 328.
150. Id. at 322.
151. See, e.g., id. at 303 (describing doctor who idealistically started cooperative plan after first
securing financial future in prior career); id. at 322 (describing other plans); see SHADID, supra note
141, at 87, 147. In many cases, altruistic entrepreneurs may also have preferred the nonprofit form and
its tax subsidies over the cooperative form. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-For-Profit
Entrepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 99 (2001).
152. The credible commitment to a high-quality product that the cooperative structure offered
helped particularly with marketing to farmers, who were generally distrustful of investor-owned insur-
ers. JOHN BAINBRIDGE, BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA: THE STORY OF MUTUAL FIRE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE 154, 169-70 (1952) (general distrust of investor-owned insurers); SHADID, supra note 141,
at 97 (promoting high-quality component of plan, which requires credible commitment to be effec-
tive); STARR, supra note 138, at 323 (higher quality care in these plans). In some cases, entrepreneurs
took a fixed salary to partially compensate for their entrepreneurial activity, which unlike a profit
share does not defeat the cooperative's commitment mechanism. See, e.g., SHADID, supra note 141, at
98 (entrepreneur appointing himself medical director for guaranteed five-year term). For further dis-
cussion of this issue, see Molk, supra note 21, at 931 n.133 (difficulties of fixed wage vs. share).
153. STARR, supra note 138, at 324-26.
154. The position adopted by the American Medical Association is illustrative of the attitude at
the time. It stated: "Voluntary insurance systems are now in operation in many parts of the United
States and are increasing in number and size .... Wherever they are established there is solicitation of
patients, destructive competition among professional groups, inferior medical service, loss of personal
relationship of patient and physician, and demoralization of the professions. It is clear that all such
schemes are contrary to sound public policy.. . . " CUNNINGHAM III & CUNNINGHAM JR., supra note
138, at 38. See also STARR, supra note 138, at 299-300 (summarizing ten principles promulgated by the
AMA for supporting private health plans, including that "[a]ll features of medical service in any meth-
od of medical practice should be under the control of the medical profession" and that "[tihere should
be no restrictions of treatment not formulated and enforced by the organized medical profession.").
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helping the plans start were expelled by their local medical societies, who
also boycotted medical facilities accepting the plans."' With these head-
winds pushing against the formation of cooperative health insurance
plans, unsurprisingly their rate of formation dwindled to a trickle.'16
Although the Supreme Court upheld the AMA's conviction for an-
titrust conspiracy in 1943, the AMA, through a combination of state lob-
bying and informal norms, was able to effectively bar cooperative health
insurance plans in a majority of states despite this ruling."' What devel-
oped in the aftermath, and which continued until the 1970s' push for
managed care, was a series of physician-controlled Blue Shield plans-
nonprofit plans controlled by physicians that covered provider-related
medical expenses"' -and fee-for-service plans that reimbursed policy-
holders for health expenses without significant control over medical utili-
zation or physician behavior.5 9
The backlash against rising health expenditures finally broke this
resistance in the 1970s," and cooperative health insurance plans have
again begun to form spontaneously, although they have been more lim-
ited in scope. In several states, health insurance purchasing cooperatives
have organized.' The entrepreneurs of these plans coordinate a group of
individuals or businesses together to buy insurance collectively from an
existing investor-owned or nonprofit insurer, potentially addressing situ-
ations of market power and adverse selection. But as medical expendi-
tures have continued to rise, so too have the potential rewards offered by
more comprehensive cooperative insurers that could address the full
spectrum of market contracting costs discussed in Part II.
The absence of a meaningful cooperative health insurer market
share today therefore seems due largely to historical path dependence,
rather than inherent disadvantages of the organizational form. Coopera-
tive health insurers formed spontaneously during a window in which re-
turns were high enough to overcome their barriers to formation, but
medical provider resistance quickly slammed it shut. Now that the win-
dow has opened again, cooperatives have begun to form once more, but
155. STARR, supra note 138, at 304-05. The personal impact to physicians from being refused
membership in the local medical society included being refused malpractice insurance, being prohibit-
ed from being recognized as a specialist, and being denied the chance to consult with other physicians.
SHADID, supra note 141, at 225; see also STARR, supra note 138, at 229 (noting how a doctor's "need
for referrals and hospital privileges" produced a dependence on physician colleagues that would be
undermined by expulsion from the local medical society).
156. STARR, supra note 138, at 320-21.
157. Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); STARR, supra note 138, at 305-06.
158. STARR, supra note 138, at 306-07.
159. Id. at 327, 331, 381.
160. Id. at 381.
161. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-49, PRIVATE HEALTH
INSURANCE: COOPERATIVES OFFER SMALL EMPLOYERS PLAN CHOICE AND MARKET PRICES 9 (2000)
(describing several such cooperatives); About Us, FARMERS' HEALTH COOPERATIVE OF WIScONsIN,
http://www.farmershealthcooperative.com/aboutus.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (a recently-formed
health insurance purchasing cooperative).
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the inherent difficulty in starting a cooperative, 16 2 and the unfamiliarity of
the form to most, 163 implies that an external boost may be necessary.
Notably, mutual property insurers solve similar contracting failures
as do cooperative health insurers, and therefore offer similar advantages.
The credible commitment structure of mutual property insurers solves
problems from disparities in sophistication and difficulty in comparison
shopping;'TM and property insurance has similar problems of asymmetric
information (the insurer might opportunistically deny paying claims, or
the policyholder might know she is lower risk than the insurer believes),
moral hazard (the policyholder might not take sufficient steps to avoid a
loss if her home is insured), and mismatched time horizons (the ad-
vantage of renovation that permanently reduces the likelihood of future
losses does not completely inure to the insurer).'6 5 Unlike with health in-
surance, however, the evolution of property insurance markets did not
experience coordinated resistance that undermined spontaneous cooper-
ative formation, and mutual property insurers consequently have signifi-
cant market share today.*6
V. SUBSIDIES AND GOVERNANCE
Cooperative health insurers solve many of the same market failures
as do mutual property insurers. Thus, cooperatives' success in the prop-
erty insurance market suggests cooperatives could offer efficiencies in
the health insurance market as well. Absent extended resistance by med-
ical providers that disproportionately raised the costs of starting one, co-
operative health insurers might already have arisen organically as they
have in property insurance. Because health insurance cooperatives still
face barriers to formation, cooperative health insurers require an exter-
nal stimulus to reach their full potential. This Part makes the case for
subsidies and then develops optimal subsidization and governance best
practices for health insurance cooperatives.
Any financial subsidy that is given to health insurance cooperatives
will make them comparatively more attractive and increase their proba-
bility of forming. Not all subsidies are equivalent, however; careful tailor-
ing can encourage maximum welfare gains per dollar of subsidy while en-
suring that unanticipated adverse consequences from subsidization are
minimized. These lessons will be used in the final Part to assess the need
162. See Underwood, supra note 18.
163. See id.
164. Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263,
1318 (2011).
165. For more extended treatment of mutual property insurers' relative advantages, see Henry
Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual Versus Stock, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125,
128 (1985); Molk, supra note 21, at 920-21, 941 n.174.
166. For comprehensive treatment of the mutual property insurance industry, see BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 152; RICHARD B. HEFLEBOWER, COOPERATIVES AND MUTUALS IN THE MARKET SYSTEM
162-76 (1980); HAROLD W. WALTERS, A CENTURY OF COMMITMENT: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES, 1895-1995 (1994).
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for the ACA's subsidization of cooperative health insurers, the manner
in which the ACA subsidizes them, and the restraints the ACA places
upon their organization.
A. Why Subsidize
Before discussing optimal subsidization strategies, the case must
first be made for why a subsidy is required-something that was largely
ignored in the health reform debate. The answer to this question depends
both on whether cooperative insurers promise any welfare gains and
whether cooperatives will form in adequate numbers absent subsidy.
Part III has shown how cooperative health insurers could provide
benefits unobtainable by other methods of health insurer ownership. In
other work, I have also shown why the private marketplace is unlikely to
provide an adequate number of cooperatives absent a subsidy, because
entrepreneurs cannot capture most of the welfare gains that their efforts
generate.167 Further, because cooperatives are an unfamiliar sight to most
potential health insurance customers outside of, perhaps, the grocery
store market, early entrants face the additional hurdle of convincing po-
tential policyholders both that cooperative insurers are viable and that
they offer unique advantages.16 These factors push towards supporting
cooperative health insurers.
B. How to Subsidize
Different subsidies can have different impacts on potential coopera-
tive health insurer success. Below I consider financial and nonfinancial
possibilities.161
1. Financial Subsidy
Financial subsidies that increase the comparative attractiveness of
cooperatives could be effective at promoting them. The primary barriers
that impede cooperative health insurers relate to their formation: entre-
preneurs are unlikely to start new firms as cooperatives, 0 and the lack of
a meaningful presence of cooperative health insurers drives consumer
unfamiliarity with them, raising the costs of getting new customers on
board."' Therefore, financial subsidies that target only the formation of
new health insurance cooperatives are likely to be more effective per
dollar of subsidy in comparison to subsidies that continue past startup.
167. See Molk, supra note 21, at 945-47.
168. Markon, supra note 99.
169. For more in-depth treatment of subsidies as a tool for solving the general lack of cooperative
starts, see Molk, supra note 21, at 945-57.
170. Id. at 930-35.
171. Id. at 937-38.
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Additionally, unlike long-term subsidies, financial subsidies that
target only formation do not risk long-term costs if the subsidies end up
over-promoting cooperatives at the expense of other forms.172 Nor can a
compelling case be made for subsidizing cooperative health insurers over
the long term. Although starting a new cooperative insurer could be sub-
sidized to compensate for the externalities the entrepreneur's activity has
on other members, the surpluses created by cooperative health insurers'
ongoing operations are largely captured by its membership and need no
stimulus to be provided at efficient levels.1 73
Financial subsidies could take a variety of forms, two of which I
consider here. The first would pay entrepreneurs directly for forming co-
operatives. Such a subsidy could be effective at maximizing cooperative
starts per dollar of subsidy, as it directly targets the deterrent to entre-
preneurs of being undercompensated when selecting the cooperative
form. Tying the subsidy's amount to the cooperative's success could en-
sure entrepreneurs exert effort in structuring and managing the firm to
its full potential.1 74
The second method would provide loans or grants that entrepre-
neurs could use to help finance the cooperative's early operations. Be-
cause cooperatives' equity must come exclusively from its policyholder-
owners, their cost of capital is relatively high."'7 Low-interest loans or
grants could bring these borrowing costs back down. While this policy
would encourage formation of cooperative health insurers, it would yield
a lower formation rate per dollar of subsidy than an alternative that re-
wards entrepreneurs directly. If a major deterrent to cooperative for-
mation is entrepreneurs' comparatively lower personal return, then as-
sisting cooperatives' financing is a less cost-effective strategy, because
much of the subsidy's benefit is not captured by the entrepreneur but in-
stead goes to the other owners. Such a policy may be more politically ex-
pedient, however, than a bounty for new cooperatives.
2. Nonfinancial Subsidy
Nonfinancial initiatives could also encourage formation of coopera-
tive health insurers. I consider here education and regulatory standards
as two of several viable strategies.
172. Id. at 951.
173. The ongoing presence of cooperative health insurers may have some positive spillovers such
as promoting competitive prices in otherwise non-competitive markets or reducing the number of un-
insured individuals who would otherwise seek uncompensated emergency room treatment. See supra
note 6 and accompanying text. These advantages, however, are not unique to cooperative health in-
surers and instead are a consequence of any new entrant, giving no reason to subsidize cooperative
health insurers in particular.
174. Because many of the cooperative's benefits could not be accurately gauged by the firm's fi-
nancials, developing such a metric could require some creativity. One method might tie the subsidy to
the membership's annual approval rating of the insurer, which would encourage the entrepreneur to
design a firm that continues to maximize the membership's welfare.
175. Molk, supra note 21, at 927.
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a. Education
When policyholders are wholly unfamiliar with cooperatives as
health insurers, the difficulty in attracting policyholders grows because
they must be first convinced that the unfamiliar form of ownership is a
viable possibility. This difficulty increases the costs of forming a coopera-
tive and makes initial formation less likely."' Once cooperatives pene-
trate the market and become a familiar feature to policyholders, this cost
dissipates and forming future cooperatives becomes easier, as has hap-
pened with mutual insurers in the property and life insurance markets.1 7
Early entrants, therefore, bear a disproportionate cost that may keep
them from entering in the first place.178
Additionally, as Table 2 shows,' 79 cooperatives are effective at re-
ducing overconsumption of healthcare only if policyholders are first in-
formed about what the cooperative ownership structure means. When
participants were simply presented with a cooperative health insurer,
they were no more likely to choose the low-cost treatment option than
when presented with any other type of health insurer. Increasing the
public's knowledge about cooperative ownership could therefore be just
as important as increasing the public's receptiveness to the organization-
al form.
A policy that publicized cooperatives' potential as health insurers or
that provided financial support for cooperatives to undertake outreach
could both reduce the initial hurdle faced by early cooperative entrants
and make those cooperatives more effective at reducing inefficient
healthcare consumption. Because the benefits from an educational cam-
paign accrue to all cooperative health insurers and are a method of solv-
ing an initial coordination problem, financing this policy with an assess-
ment on cooperative health insurers' future profits could be a sensible
approach.
b. Regulatory Standards
The protection offered by the cooperative ownership structure pre-
sents the possibility that regulatory requirements could be relaxed, mak-
ing it easier for cooperative health insurers to do business. Insurance is a
highly regulated industry: insurers are generally subject to solvency re-
quirements, price constraints, restrictions on market conduct, and limita-
tions on the types of policies they can sell.'" This regulation can be bur-
densome to comply with, but it is commonly justified as an essential
176. Id.
177. Id. at 942-43.
178. To be sure, initial entrants may enjoy a period of super competitive profits, if new coopera-
tive insurers offer efficiency gains. But potential cooperative entrepreneurs may prefer to forego some
of these profits if entry costs drop sufficiently by waiting.
179. See infra Table 2.
180. See Molk, supra note 21, at 952-53, n.217.
908 [Vol. 2016
OWNERSHIP OF HEALTH INSURERS
consumer-protection device, since insurers may exploit market positions
over policyholders when policyholders do not own the firm.81
If policyholders own the firm, however, management becomes more
responsive to policyholder interests and the insurer's reason to exploit
policyholders will be reduced. In that case, the ownership structure repli-
cates the goals of regulation, and ratcheting back regulatory oversight of
these insurers frees regulatory resources to be focused on higher-gains
areas and reduces the cooperative insurer's operational costs. 8
Crucially, the decision to cut back on regulation rests on how re-
sponsive management is to policyholders. In other markets, some coop-
eratives adopt policies that dissuade owners from exercising oversight,
and for these cooperatives there is little reason to reduce regulation.'
For cooperatives with active policyholder involvement, however, a better
argument could be made for reducing regulation. The line need not be
drawn on a case-by-case basis. Instead, observable proxies for policy-
holder involvement could be used to determine when regulatory re-
quirements could be reduced. For example, cooperatives with greater
than, say, fifty percent policyholder participation in voting or that have
adopted participatory-enhancing measures like conditioning annual divi-
dends on attending an annual meeting could reasonably be assumed to
have the type of policyholder involvement necessary for reducing regula-
tory oversight.
C. Optimal Design and Governance
Any subsidization policy should concentrate not just on forming
new cooperative health insurers but also on facilitating (and certainly not
impeding) those cooperatives' solving the contracting difficulties dis-
cussed in Part II, thus maximizing their potential welfare gains.'8 ' To aid
this endeavor, I describe several important aspects below.
1. Distributing Surpluses
Cooperative health insurers can adopt the same initial package of
techniques to reduce healthcare overconsumption as other insurers. De-
ductibles and coinsurance, pre-approval, and disallowing coverage for
certain procedures form an effective baseline. Yet, cooperatives are in a
unique position to go beyond these traditional methods, because policy-
holders are the owners and are therefore entitled to the insurer's surplus.
181. See Schwarcz, supra note 40, at 436.
182. For analysis of the difficulties involved in changing regulatory policy, see Peter Molk & Ar-
den Rowell, Reregulation and the Regulatory Timeline, 101 IOWA L. REv. (forthcoming 2016).
183. See, e.g., J. A. C. Hetherington, Fact v. Fiction: Who Owns Mutual Insurance Companies, 4
Wis. L. REv. 1068, 1069 (1969) (describing policyholder apathy towards many large mutual insurers).
184. See supra Part II.A.
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As shown in Table 2,185 this attribute of ownership is associated with re-
duced consumption of socially inefficient medical care.
As behavioral economics has demonstrated in a variety of contexts,
framing and context can greatly impact individuals' behavior."' Charac-
teristics such as whether changes in welfare are seen as gains or losses, or
whether those changes are salient, will impact the direction and magni-
tude of individuals' responses. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that
the way in which the cooperative insurers' surpluses are returned to poli-
cyholder-owners may impact their behavior. Surpluses that are distribut-
ed at the end of the year as highly salient dividends may more effectively
deter policyholders from over consuming healthcare than surpluses that
are used in a less salient manner to promote policyholder health and
wellness, for example.
To understand the relationship between different uses of surpluses
and policyholder behavior, as part of the experiment, discussed in Part
111,187 participants were asked whether their selection of high versus low
cost treatment would be affected by how the insurer used year-end sur-
pluses. Participants were given five ways the insurer could distribute sur-
pluses, including direct distributions to policyholders, indirect distribu-
tions to policyholders, and distributions to non-policyholders (investors,
or the public). The precise possibilities are reproduced in Table 3.188
For each of the insurer's potential use of surpluses, participants se-
lected along a scale ranging from significantly more likely to choose the
socially efficient, low-cost ice/rest option (assigned a score of -3) to sig-
nificantly more likely to choose the high-cost specialist option (assigned a
score of 3). For each type of insurer ownership, the results of t-tests that
the particular use of surplus would have no effect are presented in Table
3 189
As the table shows,"so the way the insurer uses operating surpluses
can have significantly different effects on policyholder behavior. Gener-
ally, if policyholders ultimately benefit from the surplus, policyholders
are more likely to choose the low-cost treatment option. Across all own-
ership types, and irrespective of whether an explanation of the ownership
form was provided, participants were more likely to choose the low-cost
treatment option when surpluses were distributed to them directly by re-
ducing future premiums or (for the cooperative) distributed to policy-
holders. Likewise, across all ownership types policyholders were more
likely to choose the low-cost treatment option when surpluses were dis-
tributed to them indirectly by promoting policyholder health and well-
ness or being donated to charities focused on improving public health.
185. See infra Table 2.
186. See Molk, supra note 21, at 912-13, n.55.
187. See supra Part H1I.
188. See infra Table 3.
189. See id.
190. See id.
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On the other hand, when surpluses were neither directly nor indi-
rectly distributed to policyholders, participants were not more likely to
choose the low-cost option and, in some cases, were significantly more
likely to choose the high-cost treatment option. These surplus distribu-
tions included distributions to investor-owners, spending to expand the
membership base (empire building), or increasing the insurer's employ-
ees' salaries. These results generally suggest a primary motive of policy-
holder self-interest. Policyholders might be more inclined to reduce the
insurer's expenses, but only if policyholders benefit from doing so.
When surpluses are distributed to policyholders, the manner of this
distribution can also differentially impact behavior. For all but the coop-
erative health insurer, surpluses that are used to reduce future premiums
consistently had the largest influence in pushing policyholders towards
the low-cost treatment. For the cooperative insurer, surpluses that are
distributed as either dividends or used to reduce future premiums had
equivalently large effects on promoting the low-cost option. Across all
ownership types, these salient, direct distributions to policyholders were
more effective at promoting the low-cost treatment choice than indirect
distributions.
This effect could arise because policyholders perceive direct distri-
butions to provide the most self-benefit per dollar of distribution- some
benefits from indirect distributions escape to non-policyholders due to
the indirect nature. It could also be that direct distributions are more sa-
lient to policyholders and, as behavioral economics would predict, there-
by have a greater effect on behavior than indirect distributions of lower
salience. Additional experimentation could further disentangle this rela-
tionship.
As before, the generalizability of these results to real world situa-
tions is unlikely to be perfect. For instance, policyholders may not know
ahead of time how insurers will spend operating surpluses, either because
they remain ignorant or because an insurer may simply be engaging in
non-binding "cheap talk."19 ' Nor will real world situations usually be as
simple as the scenario presented. Insurers likely will spend surpluses in a
variety of ways, rather than a single one. Participants' responses show,
however, that cooperative insurers should carefully consider how they
dispose of operating surpluses. While using surpluses to promote policy-
holder health and wellness may improve policyholder welfare, it could be
relatively less effective at reducing overconsumption of healthcare and
maximizing the insurer's financial value. Or, increasing employee salaries
may improve employee morale, but it could also increase the insurer's
health expenses if policyholders find out about it. There certainly may be
circumstances when it is appropriate to sacrifice financial value for other
191. This factor could be more readily overcome by cooperatives; cooperatives can make credible
prospective commitments to policyholders when policyholders elect the management, and insurer out-
reach and publicity could address the contention that policyholders generally do not know how insur-
ers dispose of surpluses.
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welfare gains, but management must be attuned to this requisite balanc-
ing.
2. Emphasizing a Common Bond
Effective cooperative design involves not just considering how to
dispose of earnings. The bond among policyholder-owners is also im-
portant. When policyholders prioritize the insurer's interest over their
own, the insurer's returns are maximized which in turn maximizes the
combined welfare of all policyholder-owners. The problem, of course, is
that individual policyholders typically have little reason to place the in-
surer's welfare above their own, since individual policyholders capture
only a small portion of any savings they generate from reducing
healthcare expenses. Thus, policyholders face a classic coordination
problem.'" If individual policyholders care about the welfare of other
policyholders in addition to their own, however, then they move closer to
the desired outcome of maximizing total welfare rather than their indi-
vidual wellbeing and solve the coordination problem."'
Cultivating this behavior justifies the traditional "common bond"
requirement imposed on credit unions, wherein members must be
"groups having a common bond of occupation or association, [or be with-
in] a well-defined neighborhood or rural district."" Members of a credit
union who share a common bond will typically care about the welfare of
other members and be better situated to monitor one another, resulting
in being less likely to exploit the bank and instead act in line with all
members' interests."' Beyond credit unions, sharing a common bond can
be a powerful motivator that induces individuals to maximize group ra-
ther than individual welfare, achieving outcomes ranging from driving
192. The insurer can take some steps to alleviate this problem by, for example, refusing to cover
treatments that most policyholders would ex ante identify as not wanting to pay for. Because of the
range of treatments and policyholder preferences, however, this problem cannot by any means be
eliminated completely-contributing to the overconsumption of medical services, among other prob-
lems.
193. A common bond, while typically associated with cooperatives, could arise with other types of
ownership. For example, one could think of an investor-owned firm with a loyal customer base that
might make sacrifices for the firm's benefit. Charitable donative nonprofits have also been associated
with a bond among donors. Usba Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY LJ. 1257, 1292 (2011). The
prospects of a common bond are particularly promising in the case where the bonded members also
share ownership, explaining its common association with cooperatives.
194. 12 U.S.C. § 1759(b) (2012); Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522
U.S. 479, 482-83 (1998). In recent times, the requirements for credit unions' common bond has been
relaxed, leading some to argue that it has lost much of its force. Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got
Cut out of Banking, 62 EMORY LJ. 483, 505-09 (2013). Interestingly, while this weakening of the
common bond may undermine customer-owner moral hazard reductions and their monitoring incen-
tives, it has not resulted in an elimination of the banks' non-exploitation commitment. Bubb & Kauf-
man, supra note 74, at 33.
195. HANsMANN, supra note 66, at 259. Some evidence suggests credit unions may be more effi-
cient than competing methods of ownership. Molk, supra note 21, at 941 n.174.
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the industry of microfinance.19 to encouraging kidney transplants,'" to
running an effective military.'" Given cooperative health insurers' poten-
tial to reduce overconsumption of medical services by generating insurer-
level savings to which policyholders are entitled, encouraging a common
bond among policyholders could greatly assist achieving this goal.19
Cooperative health insurers should, at a minimum, require a similar
common bond as credit unions, ensuring at least a basic level of similarity
among members. Bonds will vary in their strength, and early coopera-
tives could concentrate on the strongest ones, such as organizing around
service in a particular branch of the military, or graduating from a large
football university, or working for the same employer. They could fur-
ther encourage the common bond by, for example, publicizing the exist-
ence of the common bond among its membership, or developing an affin-
ity credit card that donates a percentage of all purchases to a program
related to the common bond.
A strong common bond would reduce policyholder moral hazard. It
could also make governance conflicts among policyholders easier to
solve -the major cost of cooperative ownership. I address this next.
3. Managing Governance Conflicts
One of the most significant potential problems faced by cooperative
health insurers is the prospect of governance conflicts. Policyholders will
have a range of treatments they will prefer to have covered comprehen-
sively, varying by their age, genetic predispositions, lifestyles, and other
individualized characteristics. If these policyholders become actively in-
volved in the insurer's management, they run the risk of tearing the firm
apart as they pursue their personal agendas at other policyholders' ex-
pense.20
Clearly, then, policyholders should not manage the insurer's day-to-
day operations, instead leaving most ordinary business decisions to an
elected management. The question remains, however, whether it would
be better to promote active or minimal policyholder-owner oversight of
196. See, e.g., Mamiza Haq, Michael Skully, & Shams Pathan, Efficiency of Microfinance Institu-
tions: A Data Envelopment Analysis, 17 ASIA-PACIFIC FIN. MKTS. 63, 64 (2010) (explaining the effect
of a common bond on microfinance institutions).
197. Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Custom, Contract, and Kidney Exchange, 62 DUKE
L.J. 645,649 (2012).
198. Techniques such as emphasizing a common sense of duty or a common military unit name
and insignia help form a strong sense of cohesion among military members. See Mikhael Weitzel, Mili-
tary Customs and Traditions Inspire Unit Cohesion, U.S. ARMY (July 31, 2014), http://www.army.mill
article/130931/Military-customs-andtraditions_inspireunitcohesion/.
199. A common bond could be usefully augmented with dynamic measures that emphasize the
common bond or magnify the cooperative contributions of other members. See generally Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Sharing
Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 547-75 (2003) (examining how these tools promoted file-sharing net-
works).
200. Indeed, heterogeneity among owner preferences has been identified as a significant cost that
deters cooperative ownership in many circumstances. See HANSMANN, supra note 66.
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management. Most mutual property and life insurers provide contractual
ownership rights that give policyholders very little reason to monitor
management, resulting in these firms effectively being run by an auton-
omous, self-appointed management.2 01 This strategy has also been em-
ployed in other large cooperatives, such as the financial firm Vanguard.2 02
The advantage of this delegation to management is that inter-owner con-
flicts are minimized. However, this advantage carries a price. Agency
costs rise as management grows more autonomous and less responsive to
policyholder-owner interests. The cooperative's ability to solve market
contracting problems consequently may decrease, as management pur-
sues its own agenda over owners' and protection promised by the owner-
ship structure becomes non-credible. Policyholders care less about in-
creasing the insurer's profits by reducing their own healthcare
consumption, both if the benefits from doing so are captured by man-
agement instead of policyholders as well as if policyholders feel little
connection to the insurer and one another stemming from delegated au-
thority.
Regardless of how the balance between empowering owners and
empowering management is ultimately struck, effective governance will
take steps to minimize remaining owner conflicts. One method would be
again to emphasize owners' common bond, which could align owner in-
terests and reduce conflicts in spite of heterogeneity. Additional tech-
niques can be drawn from the success of other cooperatives with owner
heterogeneity: agricultural cooperatives often do a remarkable job of
franchising farmer-owners without suffering undue conflicts.203
VI. THE ACA'S SOLUTION
There are a variety of ways to encourage cooperative health insur-
ers, and a number of design and governance principles to bear in mind
when doing so. The ACA subsidizes "nonprofit cooperatives" by giving
them low interest loans and a perpetual income tax exemption. 2 04 This
Part assesses this subsidization in light of the principles just discussed,
pointing out its strengths and weaknesses. A richer understanding of the
ACA's subsidization is essential both for future rounds of cooperative
health insurer subsidy as well as for designing effective stimulus plans
201. Hetherington, supra note 183. Because policyholders typically have no right to accrued sur-
pluses, and because the purchase of insurance constitutes only a small part of individuals' consumption
bundles, it is almost never worthwhile for individuals to incur the costs involved in monitoring their
insurer or attempting to reform their insurer's operations. Id. at 1074-78.
202. Morley, supra note 121, at 1276-79.
203. Henry Hansmann, Cooperative Firms in Theory and Practice, 4 FINNISH J. Bus. EcoN. 387,
397-98 (1999).
204. Original plans had earmarked $6 billion in government funds to be provided as grants and
loans, but the subsidy was twice reduced in response to political pressure and intense lobbying by ex-
isting health insurers. Rick Cohen, The Affordable Care Act, Three Years Later: Where Do Nonprofits
Stand?, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr. 4, 2013), http://nonprofitquarterly.org/2Ol3/04/04/the-affordable-care-
act-three-years-later-where-do-nonprofits-stand/.
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more broadly. Some terms of the existing subsidies could also be modi-
fied to comport with these principles and achieve a more effective out-
come from the $2 billion already distributed. 205
A. Strengths
1. Definitional Line-Drawing
A challenge with any subsidy is to draw the lines neither too nar-
rowly nor too broadly so that a broad class of only intended recipients is
receiving the subsidy. 206 The ACA addresses this challenge admirably.
The ACA's subsidies apply only to new organizations that are not
sponsored by a state or local government.2 " Both these limitations on the
subsidy are sensible. Because the market failure that must be overcome
is entrepreneurs' disincentive to start cooperative insurers, subsidizing
only new insurers is appropriate. Further, cooperative insurers that might
receive backing from state or local governments may not require addi-
tional federal stimulus and are properly excluded.
The ACA also requires that subsidized health insurers' governance
is subject to a majority vote of its members 20 and that profits inure to the
members' benefit3? These requirements are the essence of a coopera-
tive: members have the formal right to control and to residual assets.210
By requiring that subsidized firms adopt these principles, the ACA en-
sures that subsidies are given only to true cooperatives rather than firms
masquerading as cooperatives solely to get a subsidy.
2. Subsidies as Loans
The ACA provides $2 billion in financial subsidies as low interest
loans that must be repaid by recipients. Two types are available: (1) five-
year startup loans for financing initial startup costs, and (2) fifteen-year
solvency loans to be used for meeting state reserve requirements. 211
Startup loans carry an interest rate of one percent below five-year Treas-
205. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 511
(1986) (discussing whether to compensate for these disruptive costs policy); Molk & Rowell, supra
note 182 (analyzing costs involved in disrupting regulatory policy).
206. See generally Molk, supra note 21, at 950 (grappling with this problem in the general cooper-
ative case).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 18042(c)(2) (2012).
208. Id. § 18042(c)(3)(A).
209. Id. § 18042(c)(4). The precise requirement is that profits are "used to lower premiums, to
improve benefits, or for other programs intended to improve the quality of health care delivered to its
members." Id.
210. See HANSMANN, supra note 66.
211. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 156.520(a)-(b) (2015); DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.'S ET AL.,
CONSUMER OPERATED AND ORIENTED PLAN [CO-OP] PROGRAM INVITATION TO APPLY 10-13
(Sept. 10, 2012), available at http://www.grants.gov/search/search.do;jsessionid=TmwjPHDZ18nlD
H9QJLQvGyW8nhynGmQT3LCL2PDq2R1OW2L49jG!-62778654?oppld=136873&mode=VIEW
(click "Related Documents" tab and select "Revised Full Announcement" with the description: "CO-
OP FOA (Revised Project Officers 9/19/12)") [hereinafter FOA].
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uries, while solvency loans have interest rates of two percent below fif-
teen-year Treasuries (both with a floor of zero percent).2 1 2 Such financial
support fits nicely with the type of financial subsidy that could facilitate
formation of new cooperatives. 2 1 3
Ordinarily, the fact that loan rates are tied to Treasuries rates rather
than the individual cooperative's riskiness would be cause for concern.2 14
Linking the cooperative's financing to its riskiness ensures that market
forces would keep inefficient cooperatives from organizing, as the ineffi-
ciency manifests in high borrowing rates. Federally subsidized loans,
however, cannot be used to completely finance cooperatives' operations.
Various ongoing expenses,215 particularly marketing expenses, are explic-
itly excluded from these loans, which has been decried by cooperative
health insurer advocates. 2 16 But requiring cooperatives to fund a mean-
ingful portion of their expenses with market-based debt or more earnings
brings market discipline back into the picture, allowing market forces to
continue to deter the nonviable cooperatives from starting.
3. Governance
Given that most policyholder-owners have little understanding that
would be useful for the day-to-day operations of a health insurer, the
ACA explicitly sets up managing boards to handle these operations. 217
The ACA requires that subsidized health insurers "operate with a strong
consumer focus, including timeliness, responsiveness, and accountability
to members."' Regulations have expanded this provision to include re-
quirements that explicitly align management and member interests. 219
The board must be elected by a majority vote of members; a majority of
the board must also be members of the health insurer; and each member
is given one vote.2 20 These provisions constrain agency costs that could
arise if the firm's members delegate most decisions to management and
engage in little or no monitoring of their own.
Other provisions are aimed at guaranteeing a minimum level of pol-
icyholder involvement in the cooperative. A quorum of member-owners
must vote for new directors to be successfully elected, and the elections
must be contested with more potential directors than available seats. 22 1
These requirements deter the member-owner apathy present in most
modern property-liability insurance cooperatives that may largely give
212. 45 C.F.R. §§ 156.520(c)(1)-(2).
213. See supra Part III.B.1.
214. Molk, supra note 21, at 949.
215. FOA supra 211 at 10-13, 40.
216. Markon, supra note 99.
217. 42 U.S.C. § 18042(b)(4).
218. Id. § 18042(c)(3)(C).
219. 45 C.F.R. § 156.515.
220. Id. § 156.515(b).
221. Id. H§ 156.515(b)(1)(i), (v).
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rise to a self-perpetuating management.222 If member-owners must regu-
larly participate in electing management, there is a greater likelihood
they will become involved in other governance aspects, such as monitor-
ing management.223 A requirement that most of the insurer's business
comes from the individual and small employer markets-those markets
that individuals will most care about -further increases this likelihood.224
No provisions are aimed at deterring too much policyholder in-
volvement, however. Policyholders with heterogeneous preferences
could tear the insurer apart if they become heavily involved in govern-
ance. 2 5 This is particularly worrisome given the absence of a common
bond requirement, discussed next.
B. Weaknesses
1. No Common Bond
A common bond among policyholders could mitigate governance
conflicts and promote the efficient consumption of health services. Yet,
the ACA not only fails to impose such a requirement, but also renders
voluntary adoption of a common bond all but impossible. 226 Cooperative
health insurers, like all other health insurers, are subject to the ACA's
"guaranteed issue" provision.22 7 Under this provision, insurers must ac-
cept as policyholders any individual or employer applying for coverage if
the insurer writes individual or group coverage, respectively. 28 These in-
dividuals or employers need not have any connection among one anoth-
er. Insured individuals and employers are subsequently entitled to renew
coverage at their option.229
The guaranteed issue requirement makes sure that insurers do not
circumvent the ACA's restrictions on price discrimination by insuring
only healthy risks and leaving riskier individuals unable to buy coverage.
But, other provisions in the ACA further the same goal, making the
guaranteed issue requirement something of a safety net. The ACA's risk
adjustment mechanism, for instance, assesses a charge on insurers that
cover a comparatively healthy risk pool and provides payments to insur-
ers that insure a comparatively unhealthy pool.230 If this risk adjustment
process works as intended, then the value from a guaranteed issue re-
222. Hetherington, supra note 183.
223. Id.
224. 45 C.F.R. § 156.515(c)(1).
225. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2 (2012).
227. Id. §§ 300gg-1 (outlining guaranteed issue requirement), 18042(c)(5) (discussing the for-
mation of cooperative insurers), 18044(b) (applying requirement to cooperative insurers).
228. Id. § 300gg-1.
229. Id. § 300gg-2.
230. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1343, 124 Stat. 119, 212-13 (2010) (enacting 42 U.S.C.
§ 18063).
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quirement is reduced. 23 1 In that case, a limited exemption for coopera-
tives from the guaranteed issue requirement in favor of a common bond
would be a good idea.
There is a legitimate concern, however, that despite the benefits of a
common bond, if cooperative insurers are relieved from the guaranteed
issue requirement, they could manipulate their common bond to cover
only healthy risks not captured by the risk adjustment mechanism. This
would undermine the ACA's purposes of spreading health insurance
costs across both healthy and unhealthy individuals. Luckily, this prob-
lem is not without an antidote. An effective solution would couple guar-
anteed issue and the common bond, allowing cooperative insurers to or-
ganize around a common bond while applying the guaranteed issue pro-
provision to individuals who satisfy that common bond. These common
bonds could be chosen from a predetermined menu of common bonds
that are not closely correlated with health status-or more precisely, in
ways not closely correlated with those aspects of health status not al-
ready captured through the risk adjustment process. Candidate common
bonds might, for instance, include places of employment with 100 or
more employees and retirees, or colleges and universities with a mini-
mum number of graduates. The guaranteed issue provision would then
require that these insurers offer policies to any individual who wants one
who also satisfies the common bond. This solution allows for strong
common bonds, which promotes efficient healthcare consumption deci-
sions and facilitates governance, while assuaging concerns about using a
common bond to undermine the ACA's purposes by insuring only
healthy risks not captured by the risk adjustment mechanism.
2. Perpetual Subsidy Through Tax Exemption
The ACA amends the tax code to introduce a federal income tax
exemption for health insurance cooperatives formed within the ACA's
requirements. 23 2 A federal tax exemption is a perpetual subsidy that en-
courages capital accumulation. 233 This is inappropriate for three reasons.
First, cooperative health insurers are not in need of a perpetual subsidy.
Ongoing operations do not need to be subsidized, because welfare gains
are fully captured by policyholder-owners and thus will not be underpro-
vided.2 34 A perpetual subsidy therefore amounts to an unneeded outlay of
federal funds. Second, perpetual subsidies risk long-term costs from what
may turn out to be inappropriate subsidization of some cooperative in-
surers. Inefficient firms may persist over the long term solely because of
231. Note that prior implementations of risk adjustment have been imperfect. See Jason Brown et
al., How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? Evidence from the Medicare Advantage
Program, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 3335, 3340-42, 3355-58 (2014) (finding that imperfections in Medicare
Advantage risk adjustment mechanism lead insurers to target profitable policyholders).
232. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(29) (2012).
233. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54,74 (1981); supra note 204 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 173 and accompanying text.
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the subsidy, tying up valuable resources.2 3 5 Finally, because the tax ex-
emption encourages capital accumulation, this subsidization risks em-
pire-building (and concomitant reduced policyholder monitoring as op-
erations expand) as well as accumulating inefficiently large retained
surpluses.2 11
3. Requirement to Organize as a Nonprofit
This Article has focused on health insurers' potential as cooperative
firms. The ACA, however, requires them to be organized not as tradi-
tional cooperatives, but instead as nonprofits with cooperative features. 23 7
Whether this requirement proves problematic will depend on how future
health insurance markets develop.
The essential characteristic of a nonprofit is that excess earnings
cannot be distributed to private individuals. Nonprofits therefore have
no equity investors in the traditional sense and are generally barred from
distributing dividends.38 While the ACA insurers must have these attrib-
utes, they also have the essential features of a cooperative: member-
policyholders have the exclusive right to control, and they also have the
right to the organization's surpluses which, by statute, must be used to
improve member-policyholders' welfare.3 9 The organizations required by
the ACA, therefore, are cooperatives without either equity that could
appreciate or the ability to distribute dividends.2 4
The lack of appreciable equity may not be particularly problematic,
since surpluses can be distributed to policyholders other ways, notably by
reducing future premiums. It does mean, however, that the insurer might
accumulate sizable surpluses over time and never use them for the bene-
fit of those policyholders whose premiums were used to accumulate
those surpluses. This reduces the insurer's ability to solve the market
contracting problems described in Part III; such an insurer'loses its cred-
ible commitment not to expropriate funds from existing policyholders,
because those funds need not be returned to those policyholders and in-
stead could be held for the benefit of future policyholders. As long as ex-
isting policyholders are diligent in monitoring management and refusing
to allow the buildup of sizable endowments, this should not be a prob-
lem. But if policyholders fail to do so, another monitor should be substi-
235. This problem is particularly severe when combined with the prohibition against conversions,
discussed infra notes 249-253 and accompanying text.
236. This latter concern has been flagged with electric cooperatives, which receive a federal tax
exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(12). See generally Jim Cooper, Electric Co-Operatives: From New
Deal to Bad Deal?, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335 (2008) (discussing the federal tax exemption under 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(12) as applied to electrical cooperatives).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 18042(c)(1)(A) (2012).
238. Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise supra note 68, at 838.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 18042(c)(4).
240. More accurately, they may be analogized to mutual benefit nonprofits, like social clubs. See
Molk, supra note 21, at 910 n.46 (discussing the various state statutes under which cooperatives incor-
porate, including nonprofit statutes).
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tuted-such as scrutiny by insurance regulators, or a statutory prohibi-
tion against outsized endowments.241
The most troubling implications of the prohibition against appre-
ciable equity are that it may reduce both members' oversight of insurers
as well as the insurer's investment in long-term profitability. If policy-
holders have no transferable ownership interest in the insurer's value,
they are much more inclined to express dissatisfaction with the insurer
through exit-that is, switching insurers-than through exercising voting
rights, a problem that plagues other large insurers and mutual funds and
raises the specter of severe management agency problems.2 4 2 Additional-
ly, if policyholders have no equity stake, short-term policyholders are
made financially worse off when the insurer spends current earnings to
invest in long-term improvements, reducing the insurer's likelihood of
undertaking these investments. 2 43 Cooperatives in other markets address
this problem with sophisticated equity redemption practices that are
prohibited under nonprofit law.2 44
The virtue of no appreciable equity is that it reduces owner conflict
by encouraging delegation to management, since owners have little in-
centive to spend effort on exercising their ownership rights. Without em-
pirical evidence, it is difficult to say whether the tradeoff struck by the
ACA in favor of management delegation is the correct choice.
Nonprofits' inability to distribute surpluses as dividends is also
problematic, and it forms the topic of the next Section.
4. Inability to Issue Dividends
Table 3245 shows that distributing surpluses as dividends could be the
most effective method of addressing policyholder moral hazard and in-
ducing more efficient consumption of health services by policyholders. It
is unclear, however, whether subsidized cooperative health insurers are
allowed under nonprofit law to issue dividends. The ACA requires that
241. Others have argued that this member-owner indifference has allowed mutual insurers and
electric cooperatives to accumulate inefficiently large surpluses. HANSMANN, supra note 66, at 274;
Cooper, supra note 236, at 363-64. Unlike with these other organizations, the voting requirements
discussed above ensure that current policyholders remain involved with the insurer, which will tend to
mediate against accumulating large surpluses at current policyholders' expense.
There are additional potential problems with this arrangement. The fact that accumulated
surpluses do not belong to the policyholders that earned them deters policyholders from incurring
monitoring expenses, making external enforcement more necessary. There is also the issue of what
policyholders could do even if they did monitor. Absent voting out management, policyholders may
have few legal rights if the firm is organized as a nonprofit. See Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M.
Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y, L. & ETHics 1, 55-56 (2005) (noting that statutes and courts fail to distinguish fiduciary duties
by nonprofit purpose); Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise supra note 68, at 873-74 (noting lack
of enforcement by public actors); supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement
of nondistribution constraint).
242. Hansmann, Cooperative Firms supra note 203, at 398-99.
243. Id. at 400.
244. Id. at 398-401.
245. See infra Table 3.
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any surpluses be used "to lower premiums, to improve benefits, or ... to
improve the quality of health care delivered to its members."" Missing
from this list is returning surpluses as dividends, and even if the ACA al-
lowed dividends, distributing dividends is prohibited under most states'
nonprofit law.247
From a regulatory perspective, using surpluses to lower future pre-
miums has an equivalent effect to distributing surpluses as dividends, so a
prohibition on only dividends accomplishes little. From a behavioral per-
spective, however, dividends could be the superior method to reduce
healthcare overconsumption.248 Unambiguously allowing cooperative in-
surers to distribute dividends could help.
5. Conversion Prohibited
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the ACA prohibit subsidized
cooperative health insurers from ever converting or selling to a non-
cooperative insurer. 2 49 Their only options are to either operate as cooper-
atives or close down.mo While this prohibition makes sure that subsidies
are not ultimately used to further the interests of other existing insur-
ers-which do not have an analogous formation difficulty to coopera-
tives-it carries the danger that capital will become permanently locked
up in inefficient cooperatives, either because the firm is run poorly or be-
cause future changes in markets and regulation render cooperatives'
commitment mechanism less valuable. 5 ' A prohibition against conver-
sions or selling assets means cooperatives will continue to operate as long
as they at least break even, even if greater surpluses could be created
from an investor-owned or nonprofit insurer. Allowing cooperatives to
convert provides flexibility in the event of these future unanticipated sit-
uations.25 2
Permitting conversions, while requiring that the non-cooperative
purchasing insurer pay a retroactive market rate on any subsidized loans,
could address most concerns that conversion might allow the benefit
246. 42 U.S.C. § 18042(c)(4) (2012).
247. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr § 6.40 (2008); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT
§§ 1.40(10), 13.01 (1986). Nonprofit credit unions, however, have received special statutory authority
to issue dividends, despite what would ordinarily be prohibited by the nonprofit organizational form.
12 U.S.C. § 1763; Dividends, CREDIT UNION TIMEs, http://www.cutimes.com/tag/dividends (last visited
Jan. 16, 2015) (listing dividend-paying events).
248. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
249. 45 C.F.R. § 156.520(f) (2015).
250. See id.; Molk, supra note 21, at 942-43.
251. This latter phenomenon has occurred with property and life insurance, slowing the formation
rate of new mutual insurers in those industries and leading some existing mutuals to convert to inves-
tor ownership. See Molk, supra note 21, at 942-43.
252. See id. at 949-50 (recommending short-term subsidies that later permit market forces to win-
now out inefficient cooperatives); Molk & Rowell, supra note 182, at 32-34 (identifying the attraction
of allowing flexibility in regulatory policy).
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from federal subsidies to accrue to non-cooperative insurers.2 11 Some
other fee-based mechanism that depends on the amount of subsidized
loans and how long ago those loans were received and paid back would
also work. But a complete prohibition against conversion at any time,
while admirably easy to implement, is too broad.
6. Regulatory Scrutiny Cannot Be Lessened
The ACA explicitly provides that cooperative health insurers be
subject to at least the same regulatory scrutiny as other health insurers.25 4
As discussed in Section V.B., it may be appropriate to reduce regulation
of cooperative insurers, because the cooperative ownership structure
promises the same policyholder protection that regulation seeks to repli-
cate. Allowing for the possibility to reduce regulatory oversight over co-
operative insurers if policyholders are already doing so could free coop-
erative insurers to pursue their business while liberating regulatory capi-
capital to be spent where it would be more effective.
7. No Education Requirement
As discussed above,255 educating potential policyholders about co-
operative ownership and cooperatives' presence in everyday markets
could reduce cooperatives' formation costs and make those cooperatives
more effective at managing healthcare overconsumption. While savvy
cooperative insurer management will educate policyholders voluntarily,
there is no requirement that insurer management be savvy.25 6 Thus, a re-
quirement that subsidized cooperatives spend a meaningful portion of
their funding on outreach that educates the public and prospective poli-
cyholders about cooperative ownership could be sensible.
Yet, not only is there no such requirement, but also there was a
prohibition against spending any subsidy dollars on marketing that was
interpreted to include spending on general education, until later regula-
tions were issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.2 57
253. It bears noting that in a competitive market, when the insurer is sold or converts, any effects
from the subsidy will accrue to the cooperative's policyholder-owners (the original intended audi-
ence), rather than the purchaser.
254. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18042, 18044 (2012) (holding that private insurers are not subject to certain reg-
ulation unless cooperative insurers are also subject to that regulation). The dimensions regulated in-
clude price, market conduct, and solvency regulation. Id. § 18044(b).
255. See supra Part V.B.2.a.
256. See, e.g., Application by the Proposed Vt. Health CO-OP For a Certificate of Pub. Good and
Certificate of Auth. to Commence Bus. as a Domestic Mut. Ins. Co., Docket No. 12-041-I (Vt. Dep't of
Financial Regulation May 22,2013), available at http://www.dfr.vermont.gov/sites/default/files/CO-OP-
Order-Full%2OText.pdf (raising solvency concerns, governance concerns, and conflicts of interest be-
tween the president of the insurer's board and policyholders in denying Vermont health insurance
cooperative a license to sell insurance in Vermont).
257. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Establishment of Consumer Operated and Ori-
ented Plan (CO-OP) Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 77,392, 77,396 (Dec. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
pt. 156); FOA, supra note 211, at 40; Markon, supra note 99.
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Nor did governments step in to provide outreach in the insurers' stead.2 58
While insurers were free to spend non-subsidy dollars on outreach, a
prohibition on using federal dollars appears of little value, and the failure
to require or recommend this type of outreach was a missed opportunity.
VII. CONCLUSION
Policyholder-owned cooperative health insurers have significant po-
tential in modern health insurance markets. Through the commitment to
policyholder interests offered by policyholder ownership, these insurers
promise potential welfare gains by credibly providing high quality insur-
ance at reasonable prices. They also may further the social goal of reduc-
ing healthcare overconsumption. Competing investor-owned and non-
profit health insurers, with their alternative incentives, ownership
structures, and resultant governance differences, cannot match this po-
tential.
Because of the unique barriers to starting cooperatives, a compen-
sating subsidy such as that contained in the ACA is an appropriate reac-
tion to jumpstart these organizations. Some aspects of the subsidy are
well designed, but others appear poised to exacerbate governance diffi-
culties inherent in the cooperative form while preventing the structure's
commitment mechanism from realizing its full potential. Indeed, given
these disadvantages, it may not be surprising that half the subsidized in-
surers have already failed. While future performance will show whether
remaining insurers will be sufficiently nimble and creative to compensate
for these handicaps, my hope is that the lessons drawn from this Article
will be useful in avoiding the imposition of these roadblocks in the fu-
ture.
258. See Markon, supra note 99.
No. 3] 923
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
TABLE 1: SEVEN HEALTH INSURER OWNERSHIP CONDITIONS
Condition Language
Investor-owned (unde- You are a customer of an investor-owned for-
fined) profit health insurance company.
Investor-owned (de- You are a customer of an investor-owned for-
fined) profit health insurance company. In an investor-
owned for-profit company, the investors elect the
company's management and share the company's
profits.
Nonprofit (undefined) You are a customer of a nonprofit health insur-
ance company.
Nonprofit (defined) You are a customer of a nonprofit health insur-
ance company. In a nonprofit company, any earn-
ings must be used to support the company's mis-
sion and cannot be distributed to individuals.
Cooperative (unde- You are a member-owner of a cooperative health
fined) insurance company.
Cooperative (defined) You are a member-owner of a cooperative health
insurance company. In a cooperative, the policy-
holders elect the company's management and
share the company's profits.
Ownership unspecified (no language)
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TABLE 2: PROBABILITY OF CHOOSING Low-COST TREATMENT
(ODDS RATIOS)
Age 1.029*** 1.029***
[1.010,1.048] [1.010,1.048]
Asian Male 0.507** 0.500**
[0.277,0.929] [0.274, 0.9151
Asian Female 0.318*** 0.319***
[0.140,0.724] [0.138, 0.736]
For-Profit Insurer (defined) 1.501 1.492
[0.831, 2.708] [0.824, 2.701]
Nonprofit Insurer (undefined) 1.672* 1.691*
[0.914, 3.060] [0.923, 3.099]
Nonprofit Insurer (defined) 1.753** 1.758**
[1.019, 3.017] [1.017, 3.038]
Cooperative Insurer (undefined) 1.068 1.060
[0.578, 1.972] [0.570,1.969]
Cooperative Insurer (defined) 2.372*** 2.375***
[1.313,4.284] [1.308, 4.313]
Unspecified Insurer 1.256 1.275
[0.748,2.110] [0.756, 2.149]
Individualism 0.964
[0.748, 1.242]
Political Party 0.942
[0.830, 1.069]
N 936 936
* signifies p-value less than 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. All estimates are odds ratios. Estimates are
reported with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
Other explanatory variables included in the regressions but not shown are: white female, black
male/female, Hispanic male/female, "other" race male/female, education attained, whether cur-
rently enrolled in school, employment status, household income, household size, number of
household members under 18, marital status, and years living in the U.S.
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TABLE 2A: PROBABILITY OF CHOOSING Low-COST TREATMENT
(LOGIT COEFFICIENTS)
Age 0.028*** 0.029***
[0.010,0.047] [0.010, 0.0471
Asian Male
-0.678** -0.692**
[-1.283, -0.074] [-1.296, -0.089]
Asian Female
-1.146*** -1.144***
[-1.969, -0.322] [-1.982, -0.306]
For-Profit Insurer (defined) 0.406 0.4060.400
[-0.185, 0.996] [-0.194,0.993]
Nonprofit Insurer (undefined) 0.514* 0.514*0.525*
[-0.090, 1.119] [-0.080, 1.131]
Nonprofit Insurer (defined) 0.561** 0.564**
[0.019,1.104] [0.017,1.111]
Cooperative Insurer (undefined) 0.065 0.058
[-0.548, 0.679] [-0.562, 0.678]
Cooperative Insurer (defined) 0.864*** 0.865***
[0.272, 1.455] [0.269, 1.462]
Unspecified Insurer 0.228 0.243
[-0.290, 0.747] [-0.280, 0.765]
Individualism
-0.037
[-0.290, 0.217]
Political Party 
-0.060
[-0.187, 0.067]
Constant
-1.918 -1.663
[-4.882, 1.046] [-4.672, 1.345]
N 936 936
* signifies p-value less than 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Estimates are reported with 95% confidence
intervals in brackets.
Other explanatory variables included in the regressions but not shown are: white female, black
male/female, Hispanic male/female, "other" race male/female, education attained, whether cur-
rently enrolled in school, employment status, household income, household size, number of house-
hold members under 18, marital status, and years living in the U.S.
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